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ABSTRACT 
 
 
STEPHEN GLENN MARTIN. Changes in venture capital funding and the process of 
creating nascent firm value (Under the direction of DR.TAO-HSIEN DOLLY KING) 
 
In Chapter 1, I examine the role of venture capital syndication in a firms’ ability to 
efficiently time the initial public offering market, as well as the benefits of syndication to the 
issuing firms and venture capitalists. The results indicate that there is a positive relationship 
between the level of venture capital syndication and IPO market timing. I also find a positive 
relationship between venture capital syndication and initial returns, as well as the extent to which 
an offering prices above the midpoint of the initial filing range. Finally, the results indicate that 
there is a positive, relationship between venture capital syndication and the initial IPO filing 
range. 
In Chapter 2, I examine the effects of seed accelerator program participation on 
subsequent follow-on funding. I find that seed accelerator participation is significantly related to 
subsequent follow-on funding, after controlling for firm characteristics as well as macro-level 
variables. The results indicate that firms that participate in an accelerator program are more likely 
to receive follow-on funding in the three years that follow their initial seed funding. I also find 
that the follow-on funding of accelerated firms exhibits favorable characteristics, as compared to 
firms that do not participate in such a program. 
Chapter 3 studies the recent initial public offering trends in the market for real estate 
investment trusts, in an effort to determine if there is support for the primary theories related to 
the decline in initial public offerings. The results support the Economies of Scope Theory, and are 
inconsistent with the Regulatory Overreach Theory, with respect to small-firm real estate 
investment trust initial public offerings. The results also provide limited support for the 
Regulatory Overreach Theory, with respect to the impact of regulations on the volume of large-
firm real estate investment trust initial public offerings. 
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CHAPTER 1: THE ROLE OF VENTURE CAPITAL SYNDICATION 
IN INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERING MARKET TIMING AND PRICING 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The market timing of initial public offerings (IPOs) has been a well-documented 
phenomenon since it was first investigated by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) in 1963, and Ibbotson and Jaffee (1975) established the initial foundation for the 
extant literature on the topic. There is a recognized tendency for IPOs to be clustered 
around certain time periods. These clusters, or waves, of higher-than-average IPO 
activity, often termed “Hot Issue Markets,” create pronounced cycles in the number of 
initial public offerings per month and year, as well as impact initial returns of the 
clustered offerings (Ibbotson, Sindelar, and Ritter (1988, 1994) and Lowery and Schwert 
(2002)). 
A long line of research has emerged to analyze these IPO waves. While the 
literature has not dispositively explained the clustering of new equity issues, a number of 
theories have been presented as to the phenomenon’s existence and causes. The seminal 
paper Lerner (1994b) provides support for the proposition that firms seek to issue initial 
public stock when equity values are high, and further, that venture capital (VC) firms are 
particularly talented at this market timing. More recently, several models have attempted 
to explain IPO market timing by focusing on an information spillover hypothesis, in 
which initial “pioneer” firms issue public equity, which then triggers a wave of 
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subsequent “follower” firms going public. According to the theory, the overall result is 
observable waves of IPOs (Lowery and Schwert (2002)). 
Another branch of literature examines a relatively new possible explanation for 
IPO waves. Schultz (1993), for example, argues that more firms issue initial equity when 
stock prices increase. While this behavior is unrelated to managers’ ability to predict 
future returns, the author suggests that the result is the observed long-run 
underperformance of IPOs. Since the theory is not based on an issuer’s ability to time the 
IPO market, and rather relies solely on the observation of high market prices, it is 
referred to as “Pseudo Market Timing.” Other notable research has examined the 
consequences of market timing with an eye towards explaining its causes. (See, for 
example, Alti (2005, 2006)). While the numerous studies approach IPO market timing 
from different perspectives, and a distinct lack of theoretical consensus persists, there is 
considerable overlap in theories. 
Although there is vast support for the proposition that firms time the market, as 
well as the fact that market timing can benefit the issuing company and its initial 
investors (Ibbotson and Jaffee (1975), Ibbotson, Sindelar, and Ritter (1988, 1994), and 
Lerner (1994b)), an unexplored aspect of the IPO market-timing phenomenon is the 
extent to which venture capital syndication, which has become an accepted normal 
(Lerner (1994a)), affects market timing. This gap in the literature provides an opportunity 
for fruitful research. Since there is support for the theory that firms time the market with 
their equity offerings, and venture capitalists play a significant role in the managerial 
decision making process of going public (Keuschnigg (2004), Barry, et al. (1990), and 
Gompers (1995)), it poses a fundamental question: To what extent does venture capital 
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syndication affect a firm’s ability to efficiently time the IPO market? It is this question 
that the analysis herein undertakes to answer. To my knowledge no literature has 
addressed this issue. 
Based on a sample of 3,014 initial public offerings, I examine the role of venture 
capital syndication in the firms’ ability to efficiently time the IPO market, as well as the 
benefits of syndication to the issuing firms and venture capitalists. In studying the affects 
of syndication on IPO market timing and pricing, this paper addresses two interlinked 
issues. First, I analyze the impact of the level of venture capital syndication on the market 
timing of the IPOs during the sample period. My findings indicate that there is a positive 
relation between the level of VC syndication and IPO market timing. I find that, on 
average, the syndication of an IPO leads to the IPO going public during a month in which 
the average monthly return is 26%, compared to 20% for non-syndicated firms. The 
average for all IPOs is 24%. Further, using an the monthly percentage of IPOs that priced 
above the midpoint of their original filing range as an alternative measure of market 
hotness, I find that, on average, syndicated firms go public during periods in which the 
average monthly percentage of IPOs that price above the midpoint of their range is 47%. 
This is compared to 44% for non-syndicated IPOs. The average across the entire sample 
is 46%. 
To further analyze the relation between venture capital syndication and IPO 
market timing, I use multivariate regression based on a number of specifications. I find 
that there is a significant, positive relationship between whether a firm is syndicated by 
more than one venture capitalist and both measures of market timing. Additionally, I find 
that there is also a significant, positive relation between the level of VC syndication and 
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each measure of market timing. All of the models suggest that the syndication of venture 
capital increases a firm’s ability to time the IPO market, and that the level of such 
syndication contributes positively to this ability. 
As a second analysis of this study, I examine the benefits of syndication and 
efficient IPO market timing, in terms of the firm, as well as the primary and secondary 
markets. Specifically, I examine the effects of VC syndication on initial returns, pre-IPO 
gain, and initial IPO price range. The literature has suggested a number of benefits to 
venture capitalists from the deliberate underpricing of equity offerings. (Lerner (1994b)). 
I find a positive, and significant, relation between venture capital syndication and 
initial returns. The result holds when testing only the U.S. IPOs, as well as those of 
countries with 10 or more IPOs. Both the presence of a VC syndicate, in addition to the 
level of such syndication, increase the initial returns related to the offering. I also find a 
significant, positive relationship between VC syndication and the extent to which an 
offering ultimately prices above the midpoint of the initial filing range. Finally, the result 
indicate that there is a positive, significant, relationship between syndication and the 
initial filing range itself. 
This paper makes the following contributions to the literature. First, I extend the 
IPO market timing research by examining the effect of venture capital syndication on a 
firm’s ability to efficiently time the new equity market. This is a topic that, to my 
knowledge, has not been addressed in the literature previously. I empirically examine the 
relation between VC syndication and a number of measures of market timing. Again, I 
establish a strong, and statistically significant link between them. This relationship is 
confirmed in a number of robustness tests, as well as controlling for other variables that 
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are commonly thought to play a role in initial public offering dynamics. Second, in 
addition to helping fill the literary gap surrounding IPO market timing, particularly with 
respect to syndicated venture capital-backed firms, this study contributes to the literature 
by examining the benefits of such market timing to issuers, and venture capitalists. In 
particular, I find that syndicated firms enjoy higher initial returns. A third contribution 
this work makes to the extant literature is related to venture capital syndication itself. 
There have been a number of theories advanced as to why venture capital firms choose to 
syndicate their investments. Most of these theories, however, are based on operational 
and monitoring benefits to the venture capital firms. For example, Lerner (1994a) 
suggests that syndication of investments may lead to better decision making when 
choosing which firms to invest in, contribute to desirable benefits in the structure of the 
firm’s capital, and that venture capital firms may engage in “windrow dressing” similar to 
that which has been documented in pension funds (Lakonishok, Shleifer, Thaler, and 
Vishny (1991)). This study contributes to the literature by proposing IPO market timing 
and pricing as additional benefits of VC syndication. To my knowledge, no other paper 
has previously proposed such syndication benefits. 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 1.2 reviews the literature on IPO 
market timing and venture capital syndication. Section 1.3 describes the data sources and 
sample, and identifies the characteristics of the IPOs and venture capital firms in the 
study. Section 1.4 provides the empirical analysis and results of the research. Section 1.5 
includes concluding remarks. 
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1.2 Literature Review 
1.2.1 IPO Market Timing 
The market timing of initial public offerings by issuers has been a persistent 
question since the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) first studied the apparent 
phenomenon in 1963. Ibbotson and Jaffee (1975) first provided the foundation in the 
literature for what has been characterized as the “hot issues” market. In the seminal 
paper, a hot market is defined as a month in which the average first-day return is above 
the median month’s average first-day return. Initial return is traditionally measured from 
the offer price to the closing market price (Ibbotson and Jaffee (1975) and Ritter (2011)). 
This first-day return is also referred to as IPO “underpricing.” While other measures have 
been used, most revolving around volume (Ibbotson, Sindlelar, and Ritter (1994)), 
monthly average first-day returns, as outlined in Ibbotson and Jaffee (1975), is still 
followed as the standard measure of market timing. 
Ibbotson and Jaffee (1975) document the hot issue market phenomenon while 
focusing primarily on the predictability of first month new issue premia. A significant 
positive relation between initial returns and future IPO volume, and the resulting 
clustering or waves of IPOs, has also been well-established in a broad range of 
subsequent studies from biotechnology firms (Lerner 1994b) to research analyzing the 
general market for IPOs (Lowry and Schwert (2002)), to name just a few. This long line 
of literature, and the established observations that an increased number of companies go 
public after observing the greatest amount of underpricing, causing clustering of IPOs in 
waves, has presented a puzzle for 40 years. Conventional logic would suggest that firms 
would prefer to go public when initial returns are the lowest (Lowry and Schwert (2002)). 
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Although the companion puzzles of hot issue market waves, and the apparent desire on 
the part of issuing firms to go public when initial returns in the market are highest, 
remain at least partially unexplained, they have spawned a number of interesting theories 
attempting to account for the phenomena. A number of notable studies highlight the 
primary theories. 
As mentioned above, Lerner (1994b) studies biotechnology firms in an attempt to 
explain IPO waves. He finds that the companies in the sample went public when equity 
valuations were high, and conversely used private financing when values where low. The 
research further documents that seasoned venture capitalists appeared to be “particularly 
proficient” at taking companies public near market peaks. The author further provides 
explanations for the desire on the part of issuing firms to achieve large initial returns in 
their equity offerings. The paper suggests that issuing initial public equity when 
valuations are high minimizes the dilution of the value of ownership interests in the firms 
retained by the founders and venture capitalists. As a second suggested rationale for the 
findings, Lerner (1994b) argues that the deliberate underpricing of initial equity offerings 
leaves a good taste with investors. This theory has been advanced in a number of studies 
as a rationale to explain why both venture capital firms and underwriters desire larger 
initial returns. The theory argues that venture capitalists must repeatedly return to the 
public equity market with the stock of portfolio firms. Therefore, high historical initial 
returns can help them ensure that they have a good “reputation” with offerings (Lerner 
(1994b)). 
Additional notable research related to IPO market timing has focused on its 
affects on issuing firms. Baker and Wurgler (2002) suggests that market timing has an 
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impact on capital structure. Specifically, the paper argues that an issuing firm’s capital 
structure is the “cumulative outcome of past attempts to time the equity market.” Alti 
(2006) also examines the impact of market timing on capital structure. The paper reports 
that hot issue market firms issue substantially more equity, and lower their leverage ratios 
by more than cold-market firms. According to their findings, immediately after going 
public, hot market firms increase their leverage ratios, by issuing more debt, than cold 
market firms. The paper finds, however, that the effect of market timing on leverage 
disappears within two years of the IPO. 
In a broader context, literature has studied the implications of IPO waves on the 
equity markets in general. For example, Persons and Warther (1997) and Stoughton, 
Wong, and Zechner (2001) both suggest that IPO waves are not inconsistent with market 
efficiency, based on the rational information at the time of the IPO and information 
effects, respectively. Building on the idea that IPOs convey information to managers of 
future offerings, more recent research has focused on information spillovers to explain 
hot issue markets. Both Lowry and Schwert (2002) and Benveniste, Ljungqvist, Wilhelm, 
and Yu (2003) present evidence of an information spillover effect in IPOs. Each paper 
finds that IPO volume is highly sensitive to the outcomes of other recent initial public 
offerings. Lowry and Schwert (2002) additionally presents a theory that suggests that IPO 
cycles and high initial returns can be explained with a model whereby information 
learned during the IPO registration period impacts future issuing firms’ decisions to go 
public. They posit that initial returns of recent IPOs contain information on the market’s 
valuation of future IPOs, which managers then act on in determining when to undertake 
an IPO. 
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Alti (2005) also studies information as a focal point in initial public offering 
timing. The paper develops a model which is an extension of the information spillover 
line of research. The author’s theory suggests that, since offering prices are set based on 
investors’ indications of interest, the outcome of an IPO reflects information that was 
previously private. The model begins with a set of “pioneer” firms going public. After 
observing the outcomes of those IPOs, “follower” firms choose to either go public or wait 
to issue equity. Under this information spillover theory, Alti (2005) argues that IPO 
market valuations, rather than the issuing firms’ immediate financing needs, drive the 
decision to go public. In line with the information theory of market timing, Baker and 
Wurgler (2002), also find that firms issue relatively more equity than debt just before 
periods of low market returns. 
Despite the wide array of literature focused on IPO market timing, the topic is 
surprisingly unsettled. Numerous theories exist as to both why IPO waves occur and the 
impact they have on issuing firms and the equity markets. This fact reflects the 
overwhelming presence of a multitude of influences on the initial public offering process, 
and the reality that these factors often conflict with one another. 
1.2.2 Venture Capital Syndication 
Although investment syndication by venture capital firms has existed for a 
number of decades, Lerner (1994a) provides the foundational basis for literature on the 
topic. The seminal paper provides three possible rationales for the syndication of venture 
capital investments. First, the paper suggest that VC syndication may lead to better 
decisions as to which firms to invest in. As a second justification for syndication, the 
paper cites the theory found in Admati and Pfleiderer (1994) that syndication helps 
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overcome information asymmetries between investors. Finally, Lerner (1994a) argues 
that a third explanation for venture capital syndication is that it allows venture capitalists 
to “window dress” in a similar fashion to the practice of pension companies, which have 
been found to buy into firms so they can represent themselves as investors in the 
companies in their marketing materials. (Lakonishok, Shleifer, Thaler, and Vishny 
(1991)). 
 Other theories for syndication have also been suggested. For example, Locket and 
Wright (2001) used data from the UK to examine a diversification motive as a basis for 
venture capital syndication. Brander, Amit, and Antweiler (2002) also present two 
primary rationales for venture capital syndication. The first, called the second-opinion 
hypothesis, like Lerner (1994a), argues that syndicating venture capital investments 
provides an informed second-opinion related to portfolio firms. The second theory, 
referred to as the value-added hypothesis, suggests that additional VCs provide 
complimentary management skills to the syndicate. Their findings, based on Canadian 
data, support the value-added theory. Specifically, they support this conclusion with the 
finding that syndicated investments have higher returns. Casamatta and Haritchabalet 
(2007), however, suggests that the second-opinion hypothesis is the driving force for VC 
syndication. While Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu (2007) find that VC firms that are 
better networked experience significantly better fund performance. 
While numerous studies have analyzed venture capital syndication, the literature 
is surprisingly lacking related to the impact of syndication on a firms’ ability to time the 
IPO market. To my knowledge no study has examined this issue. This paper approaches 
the topic with two primary inquiries. First, I examine whether venture capital syndication 
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increases a firm’s ability to time the IPO market. Keuschnigg (2004) finds that venture 
capitalists not only finance, but also advise and bring value to portfolio firms. Barry, et 
al. (1990) further suggest that venture  capitalists specialize their investments in firms to 
provide intensive monitoring, and serve on the board of portfolios companies. If venture 
capital firms are providing these types of non-pecuniary benefits to the firms they invest 
in, one would expect that an increased level of venture capital syndication would lead to 
an increased ability to time the IPO market. 
As a second inquiry, I examine the possible benefits from venture capital 
syndication, in terms of the pricing of the offering. I test the IPO pricing in three separate 
ways. First, I explore the impact of VC syndication on initial returns. A number of 
benefits have been suggested in the literature providing venture capital firms with an 
incentive to underprice of equity offerings. (Lerner (1994b)). The initial return adjusts the 
price of the stock to reflect what the value placed on it by the secondary market. If VC 
syndication allows a firm to price it’s offering more efficiently, one would expect this to 
be reflected in initial returns. Additionally, the extent of VC syndication may impact 
investor optimism related to the stock on the first day of public trading. This theory is 
consistent with the literature which has suggested that investor sentiment plays a 
significant role in initial public offerings, both during the process of allocating the share, 
as well as after they become public. (Ljungqvist, Nanda, and Singh (2006) and Lowry 
(2003)). Additionally, I propose that larger syndication of the venture-backing leads to 
additional analyst coverage and other benefits of IPO exposure. This hypothesis is 
consistent with the literature that issuing firms seek analyst coverage related to their 
IPOs, and may even “purchase” coverage with IPO underpricing. In this regard, Cliff and 
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Denis (2005) find a positive relationship between analysis coverage as well as the 
presence of an all-star analyst on the research staff of the lead underwriter, and IPO 
underpricing. The authors further argue that “underpricing is, in part, compensation for 
expected post-IPO analysis coverage from highly ranked analysis.” 
I also test how the primary market views the stock, with respect to VC 
syndication. To examine this issue, I use the extent to which the stock sold, in the 
primary market, above the mid-point of its initial SEC filing range, This “pre-IPO 
gain/loss” is measured as a percentage of the mid-point of the initial filing range, and 
provides an indication of the primary market’s view of the offering. As a final inquiry 
related to VC syndication, I explore the impact of such syndication on the initial IPO 
filing price range. One would expect that the breadth of such range would be related to 
the uncertainty surrounding the offering. Therefore, venture capital syndication, and the 
extent of such syndication may play a role in the size of the initial public offering price 
range. 
1.3 Data and Sample Selection 
 In this section I describe the sample selection process, and descriptive statistics of 
the initial public offerings and venture capital firms in the sample. From ThompsonOne’s 
Private Equity Database, I initially collect all IPOs available which occurred during the 
period from 1980 through 2011. Such information includes IPO characteristic 
information including the company name, company nation, SIC code, date of IPO, 
offering proceeds, offering price, first day closing price, lead underwriter, and venture 
capital firm names and characteristics. I also collect data related to two measures of IPO 
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market “hotness” from Jay Ritter’s website:1 Monthly average first-day percentage 
return2 and the monthly percentage of IPOs that priced above the midpoint of the original 
filing price. Both measures are used in independent regressions as a measure of market 
hotness. Finally, I collect data related to the Underwriter Prestige Ranking, based on the 
model of underwriter ranking of Carter and Manaster (1990) and also provided on Jay 
Ritter’s website. 
From the initial data set I exclude all IPOs that do not meet certain criteria, as 
well as those for which full information is not available. Specifically, based on 
conventional finance-related research practice, I exclude all IPOs of less than $1,500,000, 
offerings priced below $5.00 per share, and the offerings of financial firms. Additionally, 
as all data is not available prior to 1980 or since the close of 2011, all IPOs prior to 1980 
and those in 2012 are also excluded from the IPO sample. 
The selection process yields a sample consisting of 3,014 IPOs from 34 
countries.3 All tests are conducted on two subsets of the IPO sample. First, multivariate 
regressions are performed on the sample including all U.S. initial public offerings. 
Second, a subset of the data including only the countries with ten or more IPOs during 
the sample period is used for the multivariate regressions.4 Baseline results are reported 
based on the United States IPOs only, which includes 2,715 initial public offerings. The 
data includes 1,934 IPOs that were backed by syndicated venture capitalists, and 781 
offerings backed by a single venture capital firm. 
                                                          
1 Jay Ritter’s website is located at: http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm 
2 This measure of market hotness dictates that an IPO is considered to have taken place during a “hot issue 
market” period if it occurred in a month in which the average first-day return is greater than the median 
first-day return of the sample. 
3 Table 1 provides the frequency distribution of the IPO sample among the different countries in the initial 
data. 
4 Countries with ten or more IPOs include Canada, China, Germany, Japan, South Korea, and the United 
States. 
 14 
1.4 Empirical Analysis 
1.4.1 Descriptive statistics of initial public offerings and venture capital firms 
 Table 1 provides the frequency distribution of the IPO sample among the 34 
countries in the initial data of 3,014 IPOs from 1980 through 2011. As discussed above, 
all tests were conducted on two subsets of the IPO data: The entire set of data including 
only the IPOs in the United States, as well as the subset of the data including the U.S. 
IPOs and those from countries with ten or more IPOs during the sample period. Countries 
with 10 or more IPOs include Canada, China, Germany, Japan, South Korea, and the 
United States. 
Table 2 outlines the frequency distribution of U.S. IPOs from 1980 through 2011, 
by year, as well as the proportion of IPOs that were backed by a syndicate of venture 
capital firms compared to IPOs that were backed by a single venture capital firm. During 
the sample period 1,934 IPOs were syndicate-backed, while 781 involved a single 
venture capital firm. The percentage of the total number of IPOs for each category is also 
reported for each year. I use the two-digit SIC code to group IPO companies into  
industry categories. Table 3 provides the SIC Classifications and corresponding 
descriptions for the IPO companies. 5 
Table 4 provides an overview of the characteristics of the sample of initial public 
offerings. The statistics are reported for the entire United States sample, as well as split  
 
 
                                                          
5 There are no IPO codes starting with 6 as, following convention, I have excluded financial firms from the 
sample. 
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TABLE 1: Frequency distribution of IPO sample by country 
Observations are IPOs from 1980 through 2011 from 34 countries. I exclude IPOs of less 
than $1,500,000, offerings below $5.00 per share, and the offerings of financial firms. 
Data is collected from ThompsonOne’s Private Equity Database. 
 
Country Frequency Percent 
   Argentina 3 0.10% 
Australia 1 0.03% 
Austria 1 0.03% 
Bahamas 1 0.03% 
Belgium 5 0.17% 
Bermuda 5 0.17% 
Brazil 7 0.23% 
Canada 69 2.29% 
China 86 2.85% 
France 9 0.30% 
Georgia 1 0.03% 
Germany 14 0.46% 
Greece 2 0.07% 
India 9 0.30% 
Ireland 3 0.10% 
Israel 5 0.17% 
Italy 4 0.13% 
Japan 12 0.40% 
Mexico 1 0.03% 
Netherlands 7 0.23% 
Philippines 1 0.03% 
Poland 1 0.03% 
Russia 2 0.07% 
South Africa 1 0.03% 
South Korea 26 0.86% 
Spain 7 0.23% 
Sweden 1 0.03% 
Switzerland 9 0.30% 
Turkey 2 0.07% 
United Kingdom 4 0.13% 
United States 2715 90.08% 
   Total 3014   
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TABLE 2: Frequency distribution of U.S. IPOs by year 
Yearly volume and percentage of the total sample of U.S. IPOs from 1980 through 2011. 
Syndicated volume and percentage report the number of IPOs each year that were backed 
by a syndicate of venture capital firms, and the corresponding percentage relative to the 
total for a given year. Non-Syndicated volume and percentage report the number and 
percentage of IPOs that involved a single venture capital firm in the given year. Total 
number of IPOs for each category are also reported. 
 
Total IPOs Syndicated IPOs Non-Syndicated IPOs 
Year Number Percent of Total by Year Number Percent of Total Number Percent of Total 
       1980 22 0.81% 13 59.09% 9 40.91% 
1981 43 1.58% 29 67.44% 14 32.56% 
1982 19 0.70% 14 73.68% 5 26.32% 
1983 105 3.87% 72 68.57% 33 31.43% 
1984 45 1.66% 29 64.44% 16 35.56% 
1985 32 1.18% 22 68.75% 10 31.25% 
1986 86 3.17% 71 82.56% 15 17.44% 
1987 73 2.69% 54 73.97% 19 26.03% 
1988 30 1.10% 19 63.33% 11 36.67% 
1989 33 1.22% 23 69.70% 10 30.30% 
1990 38 1.40% 27 71.05% 11 28.95% 
1991 111 4.09% 75 67.57% 36 32.43% 
1992 139 5.12% 104 74.82% 35 25.18% 
1993 155 5.71% 92 59.35% 63 40.65% 
1994 109 4.01% 76 69.72% 33 30.28% 
1995 159 5.86% 124 77.99% 35 22.01% 
1996 223 8.21% 147 65.92% 76 34.08% 
1997 130 4.79% 94 72.31% 36 27.69% 
1998 87 3.20% 58 66.67% 29 33.33% 
1999 245 9.02% 171 69.80% 74 30.20% 
2000 216 7.96% 172 79.63% 44 20.37% 
2001 46 1.69% 32 69.57% 14 30.43% 
2002 32 1.18% 19 59.38% 13 40.63% 
2003 38 1.40% 29 76.32% 9 23.68% 
2004 96 3.54% 78 81.25% 18 18.75% 
2005 81 2.98% 62 76.54% 19 23.46% 
2006 93 3.43% 62 66.67% 31 33.33% 
2007 87 3.20% 61 70.11% 26 29.89% 
2008 11 0.41% 7 63.64% 4 36.36% 
2009 23 0.85% 16 69.57% 7 30.43% 
2010 55 2.03% 43 78.18% 12 21.82% 
2011 53 1.95% 39 73.58% 14 26.42% 
       Total 2715   1934   781   
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among the syndicate-backed IPOs, and offerings that involve a single venture capital 
firm. Average Initial Return is computed over the entire sample period, as (vt – OP)/OP, 
where vt is the closing bid price on the first day of public trading, and OP is the offering 
price of the initial public offering, following convention established in Beatty and Ritter 
(1986). Table 4 reports average offering price, average offering proceeds, average initial 
return, and average age of issuing firm. With respect to underwriters and venture 
capitalists involved in each IPO Table 4 provides the average underwriter ranking, as 
well as the average number of VCs in each syndicate. On average 6 syndicated venture 
capital firms participated in the IPOs that were syndicate-backed. Finally, average 
monthly first-day returns is based on the Ibbotson and Jaffee (1975) measure of IPO issue 
market hotness. Average monthly percentage priced above the midpoint is based on the 
Ritter measure of IPO issue market hotness (Ibbotson, Sindelar, and Ritter (1994). 
Descriptive statistics related to the venture capital firms are reported in Table 5. I 
again separate the sample into two categories reporting the descriptive statistics for IPOs 
that were backed by a syndicate of venture capital firms, and initial public offerings that 
were backed by a single venture capital firm. The venture capital firms involved in the 
IPO transactions are matched with characteristics data from ThompsonOne’s Private  
Equity Database related to a database of 7,452 venture capital firm in existence from 
1980 through 2011. 
As reported in Table 5, based on the venture capital firms represented in the 
sample of initial public offerings, the average age of the venture firm is 16.64, compared 
to 16.88 and 16.52 for the venture capital firms among the syndicated IPOs, and non- 
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TABLE 3: Frequency distribution of U.S. sample IPOs by industry 
Observations are U.S. IPOs from 1980 through 2011 from 34 countries. I exclude IPOs of 
less than $1,500,000, offerings below $5.00 per share, and the offerings of financial 
firms. Data is collected from ThompsonOne’s Private Equity Database. 
 
Industry Categories Number Percentage 
Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing 4 0.15% 
Mining 26 0.96% 
Construction 32 1.18% 
Manufacturing 1034 38.08% 
Transportation, Communications & Utility 659 24.27% 
Wholesale Trade 86 3.17% 
Retail Trade 221 8.14% 
Services 652 24.01% 
Public Administration 5 0.18% 
  
 Total 2715   
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TABLE 4: Descriptive statistics for sample of IPOs 
Descriptive statistics for sample of United States IPOs from 1980 through 2011. I 
separate the sample into two categories reporting the descriptive statistics for IPOs that 
were backed by a syndicate of venture capital firms and IPOs that were backed by a 
single venture capital firm.  Average Initial Return is computed over the entire sample 
period, as (vt – OP)/OP, where vt is the closing bid price on the first day of public 
trading, and OP is the offering price of the initial public offering, following convention 
established in Beatty and Ritter (1986). Underwriter Prestige Ranking is based on the 
model of underwriter ranking of Carter and Manaster (1990) and provided on Jay Ritter’s 
website (http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm). Average monthly 1st-day 
returns is based on the Ibbotson and Jaffee (1975) measure of IPO issue market hotness. 
Average monthly percentage priced above the midpoint is based on the Ritter measure of 
IPO issue market hotness (Ibbotson, Sindelar, and Ritter (1994). Note that the average 
offering price above midpoint, and average price range, as a percentage of the midpoint 
are based on a sample of 1772 U.S. offerings, and 115 offerings from countries with more 
than 10 IPOs. 
 
  All IPOs Syndicated IPOs Non-Syndicated IPOs 
    Number of IPOs 2715 1934 781 
    Average Initial Return 0.18 0.23 0.11 
Average Offering Price ($) $13.85 $12.45 $13.10 
Average Offering Proceeds ($ Millions) $79.24 $78.54 $80.82 
Average Age of Issuing Firm at IPO (Years) 9.42 8.37 12.20 
    Average Number of VCs in Syndicate 4.6 6.2 1 
    Average Offering Price Above Midpoint 0.05 0.05 0.04 
Average Price Range as a Percentage of Midpoint 0.14 0.15 0.13 
    Average Monthly 1st Day Returns (Percent) 0.24 0.26 0.20 
Average Monthly % Priced Above Midpoint 
(Percent) 0.46 0.47 0.44 
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syndicated IPOs, respectively. The average number of IPOs the venture capital firms 
participated in prior to the instant offering, is 18.38 for all IPOs, 18.74 for syndicated 
IPOs, and 17.64 for non-syndicate-back IPOs. Average proceeds are also very similar for 
the 3 groups at $802 million, $807 million, and $810, respectively. The proceeds of 
offerings in which the VCs have participated on average during the 3-year period prior to 
the instant IPOs are $406 million for all IPOs, $402 million for syndicated-IPOs, and 
$471 million for non-syndicated IPOs. The number of initial public offerings in which the 
VCs have participated in, on average, during the 3-year period prior to the instant initial 
public offerings were 7.48 for all IPOs, 6.82 for syndicated-IPOs, and 7.74 for non-
syndicated IPOs. Finally, average time to exit for the venture capital firms that 
participated in all IPOs is 4.38 years. With respect to venture capital syndicate-based 
offerings, the average time to exit is 4.78 year, compared to 3.14 years for non-syndicate-
backed IPOs. 
To control for differences in the experience and reputation among the venture 
capital firms involved in the equity offerings, I use a VC Rank variable. This variable is 
computed based on the sample of IPOs, and for robustness is calculated using a number 
of possible measures of VC quality. In particular, I initially calculate a number of 
different measures of VC Rank for both the non-syndicated IPOs, as well as the 
syndicated initial public offerings, including average age of the VCs involved in the IPO, 
average number of previous IPOs among the VCs in the instant IPO, average amount of 
IPO proceeds from previous offerings among the VCs in the instant IPO, average number 
of IPOs during the previous 3-year rolling period among the VCs in the instant IPO, and 
average amount of IPO proceeds from previous offerings that occurred during the  
 21 
TABLE 5: Descriptive statistics for venture capital firms 
Descriptive statistics for venture capital firms in sample of United States IPOs from 1980 
through 2011. I separate the sample into two categories reporting the descriptive statistics 
for IPOs that were backed by a syndicate of venture capital firms and IPOs that were 
backed by a single venture capital firm. All statistics are reported as the average. 
 
  All IPOS Syndicated IPOS Non-Syndicated IPOs 
    Age of VC Syndicate (Average) 17 17 17 
Number of Prior IPOs for Syndicate (Average) 18 19 18 
Proceeds from Prior IPOs for Syndicate (Average $ Million) $802 $807 $810 
Proceeds for Syndicate (Average, 3-Year Rolling) $406 $402 $471 
Number of IPOs for Syndicate (Average, 3-Year Rolling) 7 7 8 
Time to VC Exit (Average Years) 4 5 3 
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previous 3-year rolling period among the VCs in the instant IPO.6 The 3-year rolling 
average number of IPOs is used as the primary measure of venture capital firm quality, 
expertise, and reputation in the multivariate regressions. 
1.4.2 Impact of Venture Capital Syndication on IPO Market Timing 
 As a first analysis of this paper, I study the relationship between venture capital 
syndication and a firm’s ability to efficiently time the market. I first split the sample into 
two groups: IPOs with a syndication of venture capital firms, and IPOs in which only a 
single venture capitalist is involved. Among the literature, Ibbotson and Jaffee (1975) 
first provided the foundational definition of a “hot” issues market, defined as a month in 
which the average initial return is above the median month’s average first-day return. 
According to convention, initial return is defined as the percentage first-day return, 
measured from the offer price to the closing market price (Ritter (2011)). Based on the 
above definition of a hot IPO market, there is a significant differential in this paper’s 
sample of syndicated firms’ apparent ability to time the hot issue market. As can be seen 
in Table 4, using the measure of monthly average first-day returns, syndicated offerings 
occurred during months when the average initial return is 25.93%. This is in comparison 
to 19.56% for non-syndicated IPOs. 
A second measure of initial public offering market “hotness,” developed in the 
literature, is the percentage of IPOs that priced above the midpoint of the original file 
price range (Ibbotson, Sindelar, and Ritter (1994)). The original file range is the offering 
price range in the original Securities and Exchange Commission registration. Shortly 
                                                          
6 VC Ranks are computed as averages taking the number of VCs in each offering into account. For 
example, to compute the average age of the VCs involved in a particular offering, the ages, at the time of 
the instant IPO, of all VCs that participated in the offering are computed based on the founding date of 
the VC firms, and then averaged relative to the number of VC firms participating. 
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before the actual offering, the issuer and underwriter set a final offering price. This 
measure suggests that the percentage of firms that ultimately price their offering above 
the midpoint of the registered range is an indication of how hot the IPO market is at that 
time. Based on data obtained from Jay Ritter’s website, this market hotness measure is 
included as a variable to check the efficiency of IPO market timing. Using this measure 
of initial public offering market hotness, the average monthly percentage of IPOs that 
priced above the midpoint is 46.29%. Syndicate-backed IPOs went public during months 
when the average percentage of all IPOs that month that priced above their midpoint is 
47.15%. This is contrasted with the result of 43.94% for non-syndicate-backed initial 
public offerings. The results with respect to this issue suggest a substantial difference in a 
firm’s ability to time the IPO market, based on whether the offering was backed by a 
syndicate of venture capital firms. Based on both of the conventional measures of market 
timing, the IPOs that were syndicated present results that suggest they more successfully 
timed the market for IPOs.  
To further examine the relationship between venture capital syndication and 
market timing, I use multivariate regression models of the two primary market timing 
measures. The multivariate regression model is as follows: 
 Market Hotnesst = α + β1 × Syndicationi 
+ β2 x Amount of Offeringi 
+ β3 × Age of Firmi 
+ β4 × Underwriter Ranki 
+ β5 × Venture Capital Ranki 
+ β6 × NASDAQ Returnt-1 + εi 
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where, Market Hotnesst denotes the specific IPO market hotness measure used in 
the particular regression: Monthly average first-day returns measure and Monthly average 
percentage that priced above the midpoint filing range. Results for each are delineated 
accordingly. Syndicationi denotes either a dummy variable indicating whether the venture 
capital was syndicated, or the number of venture capital firms participating in the initial 
public offering, depending on the model. In the models with a Syndication dummy 
variable zero represents those offering that did not involve syndicated venture capital, 
and one denotes those offerings with more than one venture capitalist involved. Amount 
of Offeringi is the natural log of the amount of the initial public offering. Since it has been 
found that initial returns can be affected by the size of the offering (Ritter 1984), this 
variable controls for this effect. Age of Firmi is the age of the issuing company at the time 
of the IPO. Since the age of a firm can affect the information asymmetry associated with 
the company, this variable allows for this fact in the model. Underwriter Ranki is the rank 
of the lead underwriter handling the initial public offering. Using the method outlined by 
Carter and Manaster (1990) to determine the rank of underwriters on the basis of prestige, 
I use this variable to control for the effect of the quality of the underwriter on the results. 
Venture Capital Ranki is the average number of IPOs in which the VCs in the offering 
were involved in the previous 3-year period. Five independent measures of venture 
capital expertise were tested, and the average, rolling, number of initial public offerings 
that the venture capital firms were involved in during the 3-year period prior to each IPO 
is used throughout this study. NASDAQ Returnt-1 denotes the NASDAQ composite return 
for the quarter prior to the instant offering. 
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 Table 6 reports the results related to the regressions of Market Hotness on 
Syndication, as well as the other variables. I find a positive relation between whether an 
initial public offering is syndicated and the hotness of the market at the time of the 
offering. Using both measures of market hotness, in Models 1 and 3, in the regression on 
United States firms, the coefficients are positive and significant at the 1% level. More 
particularly, Model 1, which presents the results using the average monthly initial returns 
as the measure of market hotness, indicates that there is a 5% increase in such monthly 
average when the firm is syndicated. When using the percentage of firms that priced 
above the midpoint of their offering range, the results indicate a 2.4% difference. 
 The results with respect to the level of VC syndication also indicate that there is a 
positive relationship between the level of syndication and the ability of the firm to time 
the IPO market. When testing the United States offerings using the average monthly 
initial returns as the measure of market hotness, I find a positive and significant 
relationship between such measure and the level of VC syndication, as can be seen in 
Model 2. The results with respect to Model 4, which using the percentage of firms that 
priced above the midpoint provide similar results. In reviewing the results related to the 
regressions of the sample of offerings from all countries with more than 10 IPOs, the 
results indicate that, among these offerings, there is a positive, and significant 
relationship between initial public offering market timing and both the syndication 
dummy variable and (Models 1 and 3), as well as the level of venture capital syndication 
(Models 2 and 4). 
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TABLE 6: Regressions of market hotness on venture capital syndication 
and control variables 
 
This table reports the multivariate regressions for the sample of IPOs from 1980 through 
2011. I exclude IPOs of less than $1,500,000, offerings below $5.00 per share, and the 
offerings of financial firms. The results are presented for regressions of U.S. IPOs only, 
as well as those for all countries with 10 or more initial public offerings during the 
sample period. The dependent variable is each of the two measures of market timing, 
Market Hotness, depending on the Model. The dependent variable for Models 1 and 2 is 
average monthly 1st day returns, based on Ibbotson and Jaffee (1975). The dependent 
variable for Models 3 and 4 is the monthly % of IPOs that priced above the midpoint of 
their initial filing range, based on Ibbotson, Sindelar, and Ritter (1994). Syndication 
Dummy is a dummy variable indicating whether the venture capital was syndicated. Zero 
represents those offering that did not involve syndicated venture capital, and one denotes 
those offerings with more than one venture capitalist involved. Syndication Level denotes 
the number of participating venture capital firms in the IPO syndication. Amount of 
Offering is the natural log of the amount of the initial public offering. Age of Firm is the 
age of the issuing company at the time of the IPO. Underwriter Rank is the rank of the 
lead underwriter handling the initial public offering, using the method outlined by Carter 
and Manaster (1990). Venture Capital Rank is the average number of IPOs in which the 
VCs in the offering were involved in the previous 3-year period. NASDAQ Return 
denotes the NASDAQ composite return for the quarter prior to the instant offering. 
Parameter estimates are presented with t-statistics below. * indicates significance at the 
10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. 
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1.4.3 Impact of syndication on IPO pricing 
The second goal of this paper is to examine the impact of venture capital 
syndication on initial returns, pre-IPO gain, and the initial IPO price range. To examine 
the relationship between VC syndication and how the markets price the security 
underlying the initial public offering I use three measures of market pricing. First, I 
examine the impact of venture capital syndication on initial returns.  Based on Beatty and 
Ritter (1986) and the well-developed literature on the topic, initial returns are defined as 
the first-day return, relative to the offering price: (vt – OP)/OP, where vt is the closing 
bid price on the first day of public trading, and OP is the offering price. This paper 
follows this convention. 
The initial return is a measure of the secondary market’s adjustment to the 
valuation of the stock offered. A number of benefits to venture capital firms have been 
suggested in the literature, providing venture capitalists with an incentive to underprice of 
equity offerings. Most of the benefits inure to the venture capitalist, indirectly over time, 
at the expense of the firm. (Lerner (1994b)). The initial return adjusts the price of the 
stock to reflect what the value placed on it by the secondary market. As a first measure, 
this paper focuses on examining the impact of venture capital syndication on the initial 
return of the stock. Table 4 reports descriptive statistics related to the offering firms. The 
average initial return for IPOs for the group with syndicated venture capital is 21%. This 
is in stark comparison to 14% among the IPOs that were backed by a single venture 
capital firm. The average initial return for the entire sample of all IPOs is 18%. 
As a second measure of IPO pricing, I test how the primary markets view the 
stock. To examine this issue, I use the extent to which the stock sold, in the primary 
 29 
market, above the mid-point of its initial SEC filing range. This “pre-IPO gain/loss” is 
measured as a percentage of the mid-point of the initial filing range, and provides an 
indication of the primary market’s view of the offering. It is the effect of venture capital 
syndication on this pre-IPO gain/loss that I test in this part of this paper. The average pre-
IPO gain for the sample is 5%, with averages of 5% and 4% for syndicated and non-
syndicated IPOs, respectively. 
The third measure of the impact of venture capital syndication on IPO pricing 
used is the initial IPO filing range. When announcing an initial public offering, firms are 
required to disclose, along with other information, a projected IPO price range to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission on Form S-1. While the initial filing price range is 
frequently adjusted prior to the initial public offering, this initial price range provides the 
first indication of the firm, and its underwriter’s, expectation with respect to the price of 
the stock. One would expect that the breadth of such range would be related to the 
uncertainty surrounding the offering. Therefore, venture capital syndication, and the 
extent of such syndication may play a role in the size of the initial public offering price 
range. I calculate the size of the price range, as a percentage of the midpoint of the filing 
range. This measure provides an intuitive metric to measure how the firm, and it’s 
underwriters view the uncertainty of the pricing of the stock. The sample average initial 
pricing range is 14%. Syndicated IPOs have an average price range of 15%, compared to 
13% for non-syndicated offerings. 
Each model specification regresses one of the three measures of IPO pricing as 
the dependent variable on either the VC syndication dummy variable or the level of 
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syndication, as well as the control variables. The multivariate regression model is 
structured as follows: 
IPO Pricing Measurei = α + β1 × Syndicationi    (1) 
+ β2 x Ln Amounti 
+ β3 × Age of Firmi 
+ β4 × Underwriter Ranki 
+ β5 × VC Ranki 
+ β6 × Market Hotnesst-1 
+ β7 × NASDAQ Returnt-1 + εi        
 
where, Market Pricing Measurei denotes the individual measure of market 
pricing: Initial return, pre-IPO gain, and initial IPO price range, depending on the model 
specification.7 Syndicationi denotes either a dummy variable indicating whether the 
venture capital was syndicated, or the number of venture capital firms participating in the 
initial public offering, depending on the model. In the models with a Syndication dummy 
variable zero represents those offering that did not involve syndicated venture capital, 
and one denotes those offerings with more than one venture capitalist involved. Amount 
of Offeringi is the natural log of the amount of the initial public offering. Since it has been 
found that initial returns can be affected by the size of the offering (Ritter 1984), this 
variable controls for this effect. Age of Firmi is the age of the issuing company at the time 
of the offering. Since the age of a firm can affect the information asymmetry associated 
                                                          
7 Initial return is defined as (vt – OP)/OP, where vt is the closing bid price on the first day of public trading, 
and OP is the offering price (Beatty and Ritter (1986)). Pre-IPO gain is defined as the percentage that the 
final IPO price was above the midpoint of the initial filing range. Initial price range is defined as the overall 
initial price range expressed as a percentage of the midpoint of such IPO price range. 
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with the company, this variable allows for this fact in the model. Underwriter Ranki is the 
rank of the lead underwriter handling the initial public offering.8 Venture Capital Ranki is 
the average number of IPOs in which the VCs in the offering were involved in the 
previous 3-year period. Market Hotnessi is the percentage of IPOs that priced above the 
midpoint of the filing range in the month in which the instant IPO occurred. NASDAQ 
Returnt-1 denotes the NASDAQ composite return for the quarter prior to the instant 
offering. 
Table 7 reports the results related to the regression of initial returns on the venture 
capital syndication dummy variable, and the level of such venture capital syndication, as 
well as the control variables. I find a significant, positive relationship between VC 
syndication and initial returns, in both the model using the syndication dummy variable 
as the primary explanatory variable of interest, as well as the model with the level of VC 
syndication as the primary variable of interest. In Model 1, the syndication dummy 
variable indicates that there is a 14% increase in the initial return of the firm if the 
venture capital is syndicated. The increase in initial returns when testing the sample of 
U.S. firms together with IPOs from all countries with 10 or more IPOs, is 12%. With 
respect to the level of syndication, Model 2 reports that there is an increase of 1% for 
each VC syndicate added to the offering in both US. IPOs and those from the sample 
including all countries with 10 or more IPOs. The results indicate that there is significant, 
positive relation between venture capital syndication and initial return. 
 
 
 
                                                          
8 Underwriter Rank calculations are based on the Carter and Manaster (1990) Underwriter Prestige Ranking 
model. 
 32 
TABLE 7: Regressions of initial return on venture capital syndication 
and control variables 
 
This table reports the multivariate regressions for the sample of IPOs from 1980 through 
2011. I exclude IPOs of less than $1,500,000, offerings below $5.00 per share, and the 
offerings of financial firms. The results are presented for regressions of U.S. IPOs only, 
as well as those for all countries with 10 or more initial public offerings during the 
sample period. The dependent variable is Initial Return, and is computed as (vt – 
OP)/OP, where vt is the closing bid price on the first day of public trading, and OP is the 
offering price of the initial public offering, following convention established in Beatty 
and Ritter (1986). Syndication Dummy is a dummy variable indicating whether the 
venture capital was syndicated. Zero represents those offering that did not involve 
syndicated venture capital, and one denotes those offerings with more than one venture 
capitalist involved. Syndication Level denotes the number of participating venture capital 
firms in the IPO syndication. Amount of Offering is the natural log of the amount of the 
initial public offering. Age of Firm is the age of the issuing company at the time of the 
IPO. Underwriter Rank is the rank of the lead underwriter handling the initial public 
offering, using the method outlined by Carter and Manaster (1990). Venture Capital Rank 
is the average number of IPOs in which the VCs in the offering were involved in the 
previous 3-year period. IPO Market Hotness is the monthly percentage of IPOs that 
priced above the midpoint of their initial filing range, based on Ibbotson, Sindelar, and 
Ritter (1994). NASDAQ Return denotes the NASDAQ composite return for the quarter 
prior to the instant offering. Parameter estimates are presented with t-statistics below. * 
indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. 
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TABLE 7: Continued 
      USA Countries with 10 or more IPOs 
      Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
       
 
Syndication Dummy 0.1473*** 
 
0.1243*** 
 
   
(6.92) 
 
(4.63) 
 
 
Syndication Level
 
0.0102**
 
0.0082**
    
(2.51) 
 
(2.33) 
Firm Characteristic Variables 
    
 
Amount of Offering (ln) 0.1183** 0.1264** 0.1201** 0.1211**
   
(2.43) (2.51) (2.47) (2.53) 
 
Age of Firm (Years)) -0.0067*** -0.0062*** -0.0042*** -0.0058*** 
   
(-5.87) (-5.97) (-4.73) (-4.82) 
 
Underwriter Rank 0.0114** 0.0101** 0.0103** 0.0089** 
   
(2.44) (2.57) (2.35) (2.12) 
 
Venture Capital Rank 0.0053** 0.0051** 0.0059* 0.0038* 
   
(1.98) (2.01) (1.83) (1.92) 
Macro-Economic Variables 
    
 
IPO Market Hotness 0.7131*** 0.6143*** 0.6392*** 0.6539***
   
(7.37) (6.44) (5.83) (5.93) 
 
NASDAQ Composite 
Return -.0035* -.0031* -.0026 -.0025 
   
(-1.73) (-1.89) (-1.54) (-1.57) 
 
Constant 
 
-0.7027*** -0.6318*** -0.649*** -0.5832*** 
   
(-8.43) (-8.21) (-7.72) (-7.09) 
       
       
              
 
Observations 
 
2715 2715 2922 2922 
 Adjusted R-Squared 0.45499 0.44611 0.4173 0.4082 
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The findings are consistent with the literature in the finding that venture capital 
firms provide young firms with benefits beyond financing, such as advice, monitoring, 
and general expertise. (Keuschnigg (2004) and Barry, et al. (1990). Further, venture 
capital syndication has been found to offer benefits in providing increased expertise and 
monitoring (Lerner (1994a). The results here suggest that an additional benefit provided 
by venture capital syndication is an increase in initial returns. 
The second measure used to test the impact of venture capital syndication on IPO pricing 
is pre-IPO gain/loss. Table 8 reports the results of the regressions of the pre-IPO gain/loss 
on the syndication dummy and level of syndication variables, as well as the control 
variables.9 The coefficients indicate that there is a positive relationship between whether 
an initial public offering is syndicated and the extent to which the offering is ultimately 
priced above the midpoint of the initial filing range. With respect to the sample of U.S. 
firms only, as well as that of the U.S. and all countries with 10 or more IPOs, the 
coefficients are positive and significant at the 5% level. The coefficients on the level of 
syndication, however, are not significant in the model specification (Models 2 and 4). 
This was found when testing both samples of IPOs. The results suggest that a venture 
capital syndication impacts the primary market’s pricing of the offering. If there is a 
syndicate of venture capitalists involved in the offering the offering is priced at a higher 
price above the midpoint of the initial filing range. Based on the findings, however, the 
level of such venture capital syndication does not appear to play a significant role in such 
pricing. 
 
                                                          
9 Regressions of pre-IPO gain/loss are performed on a reduced sample of 1772 U.S. firms and a 15 IPOs 
from countries with 10 or more IPOs, due to price range information being unavailable for all firms in the 
overall sample. 
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TABLE 8: Regressions of pre-IPO gain on venture capital syndication 
and control variables 
 
This table reports the multivariate regressions for the sample of IPOs from 1980 through 
2011. I exclude IPOs of less than $1,500,000, offerings below $5.00 per share, and the 
offerings of financial firms. In addition, initial IPO price range is not available for all 
firms in the base sample. Therefore, the sample for regressions related to pre-IPO 
gain/loss includes 1,772 U.S. offerings, and 115 offerings from countries with more than 
10 IPOs. The results are presented for regressions of U.S. IPOs only, as well as those for 
all countries with 10 or more initial public offerings during the sample period. The 
dependent variable is Pre-IPO Gain/Loss, and is calculated the difference between the 
midpoint of the initial IPO filing range and the final offering price, expressed as a 
percentage of the mid-point of the initial filing range. Syndication Dummy is a dummy 
variable indicating whether the venture capital was syndicated. Zero represents those 
offering that did not involve syndicated venture capital, and one denotes those offerings 
with more than one venture capitalist involved. Syndication Level denotes the number of 
participating venture capital firms in the IPO syndication. Amount of Offering is the 
natural log of the amount of the initial public offering. Age of Firm is the age of the 
issuing company at the time of the IPO. Underwriter Rank is the rank of the lead 
underwriter handling the initial public offering, using the method outlined by Carter and 
Manaster (1990). Venture Capital Rank is the average number of IPOs in which the VCs 
in the offering were involved in the previous 3-year period. IPO Market Hotness is the 
monthly percentage of IPOs that priced above the midpoint of their initial filing range, 
based on Ibbotson, Sindelar, and Ritter (1994). 
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TABLE 8: Continued 
      USA Countries with 10 or more IPOs 
      Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
       
 
Syndication Dummy 0.0242**
 
0.0184**
 
   
(2.44) 
 
(2.41) 
 
 
Syndication Level
 
-0.0012
 
-0.0011
    
(-0.73) 
 
(-0.42) 
Firm Characteristic Variables 
    
 
Amount of Offering (ln) -0.0023** -0.0025** -0.0027** -0.0034**
   
(-2.06) (-2.31) (-2.31) (-2.47) 
 
Age of Firm (Years)) -0.0003** -0.0001*** -0.0004** -0.0001*** 
   
(-2.35) (-2.94) (-2.48) (-2.74) 
 
Underwriter Rank 0.0007** 0.0008** 0.0009** 0.0013** 
   
(2.00) (2.16) (2.32) (2.52) 
 
Venture Capital Rank 0.0008** 0.0007** 0.0012** 0.0010** 
   
(2.43) (2.23) (2.51) (2.12) 
Macro-Economic Variables 
    
 
IPO Market Hotness 0.0059 0.0087* 0.0042 0.0053*
   
(1.39) (1.73) (1.18) (1.87) 
 
NASDAQ Composite 
Return -.0012* -.0011* -.0009* -.009* 
   
(-1.94) (-1.92) (-1.89) (-1.71) 
 
Constant 
 
0.0933*** 0.0149*** 0.0812*** 0.0127*** 
   
(8.35) (11.10) (7.04) (9.17) 
       
       
              
 
Observations 
 
1772 1772 1887 1887 
 Adjusted R-Squared 0.1706 0.1462 0.1634 0.1421 
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The third measure of IPO pricing tested is the initial IPO price range.10 It would 
be expected that the breadth of the IPO pricing range would be related to the uncertainty 
surrounding the offering, and that  venture capital syndication may impact the size of the 
initial public offering price range. Table 9 reports the results with respect to regressions 
of the measure of the pricing range on the syndication variables. In both models, when 
analyzing the samples of U.S. IPOs only, as well as that of the U.S. offerings together 
with those from all countries with 10 or more offerings, the results indicate a significant, 
positive relationship between the size of the initial filing price range and venture capital 
syndication. The coefficient of .0332 in Model 1, suggests that syndicated initial public 
offerings have a significant increase in the initial IPO pricing range. The other models 
produce similar results. The findings are counterintuitive to what would be expected, if 
syndicates of venture capitalists reduce risk in the offering. One would expect, based on a 
reduction in uncertainty, and therefore a smaller initial pricing range, associated with a 
larger VC syndication. The results suggest that as additional VCs are added to the 
syndication, the pricing range of the initial public offering increases. 
One possible explanation for the counterintuitive findings with respect to the size 
of the offering price range relates to the firm’s ability to extract the highest price out of 
the IPO process. After an initial public offering announcement, along with the initial 
expected price range, the firm and the underwriter of the security, present the offering to 
prospective buyers. This “road show” is designed to generate excitement and interest in 
the new issue of stock, and accumulate a number of buyers of the stock in the primary 
  
                                                          
10 Regressions of initial IPO filing range are performed on a reduced sample of 1772 U.S. firms and 115 
IPOs from countries with 10 or more IPOs, due to price range information being unavailable for all firms in 
the overall sample. 
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TABLE 9: Regressions of initial IPO price range on venture capital syndication 
and control variables 
 
This table reports the multivariate regressions for the sample of IPOs from 1980 through 
2011. I exclude IPOs of less than $1,500,000, offerings below $5.00 per share, and the 
offerings of financial firms. In addition, initial IPO price range is not available for all 
firms in the base sample. Therefore, the sample for regressions related to pre-IPO 
gain/loss includes 1,772 U.S. offerings, and 115 offerings from countries with more than 
10 IPOs. The results are presented for regressions of U.S. IPOs only, as well as those for 
all countries with 10 or more initial public offerings during the sample period. The 
dependent variable is IPO Initial Filing Price Range, and is calculated as the size of the 
initial filing price range, expressed as a percentage of the midpoint of the filing range. 
Syndication Dummy is a dummy variable indicating whether the venture capital was 
syndicated. Zero represents those offering that did not involve syndicated venture capital, 
and one denotes those offerings with more than one venture capitalist involved. 
Syndication Level denotes the number of participating venture capital firms in the IPO 
syndication. Amount of Offering is the natural log of the amount of the initial public 
offering. Age of Firm is the age of the issuing company at the time of the IPO. 
Underwriter Rank is the rank of the lead underwriter handling the initial public offering, 
using the method outlined by Carter and Manaster (1990). Venture Capital Rank is the 
average number of IPOs in which the VCs in the offering were involved in the previous 
3-year period. IPO Market Hotness is the monthly percentage of IPOs that priced above 
the midpoint of their initial filing range, based on Ibbotson, Sindelar, and Ritter (1994). 
NASDAQ Return denotes the NASDAQ composite return for the quarter prior to the 
instant offering. Parameter estimates are presented with t-statistics below. * indicates 
significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. 
  
 39 
TABLE 9: Continued 
      USA Countries with 10 or more IPOs 
      Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
       
 
Syndication Dummy 0.0332** 
 
0.0245** 
 
   
(2.44) 
 
(2.14) 
 
 
Syndication Level 
 
0.0017* 
 
0.0012* 
    
(1.89) 
 
(1.83) 
Firm Characteristic Variables 
    
 
Amount of Offering (ln) -0.0027** -0.0026** -0.0021* -0.0018* 
   
(-2.00) (-2.07) (-1.83) (-1.73) 
 
Age of Firm (Years)) -0.0002** -0.0002*** -0.0003** -0.0002** 
   
(-2.46) (-2.75) (-2.22) (-2.31) 
 
Underwriter Rank 0.0015*** 0.0013** 0.0027*** 0.0022** 
   
(2.91) (2.55) (2.45) (1.97) 
 
Venture Capital Rank 0.0013*** 0.0013*** 0.0030*** 0.0026*** 
   
(3.77) (3.72) (3.31) (3.14) 
Macro-Economic Variables 
    
 
IPO Market Hotness 0.0092* 0.0122** 0.0031* 0.0072** 
   
(1.74) (2.29) (1.68) (1.97) 
 
NASDAQ Composite 
Return -.0008* -.0007* -.0004* -.0004* 
   
(-1.87) (-1.83) (-1.75) (-1.74) 
 
Constant 
 
0.0809*** 0.1029*** 0.0709*** 0.0829*** 
   
(9.60) (11.65) (8.73) (9.03) 
       
       
                     
 
Observations 
 
1772 1772 1887 1887 
  Adjusted R-Squared 0.1871 0.1588 0.1734 0.1572 
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market. One would expect that offerings that are backed by a syndicate of venture 
capitalists, as opposed to a single VC, would have more credibility during this process. A 
possible explanation for the positive relationship between the initial IPO price range and 
VC syndication is that the larger price range allows the firm additional potential upside to 
increase the IPO price, without having to amend the initial IPO filings. IPOs that are 
more largely syndicated may be viewed as offering a better opportunity to increase the 
price during the road show. If that is the case, the underwriters may be pricing these firms 
with a wider range to allow room to capture the greater upside potential of syndicated 
offerings if demand for the stock is strong. 
1.5 Conclusion 
Market timing of initial public offerings, creating clusters or waves offerings in 
hot issue markets, by firms issuing public equity has been a well-documented 
phenomenon. Although there is a fair amount of support for the proposition that firms 
time the market, as well as how market timing can benefit the issuing company, 
underwriters, and venture capitalists, the extent to which venture capital syndication 
affects a firm’s ability to efficiently time the IPO market, is an unexplored area of the 
literature. 
In this paper, I examine the role of venture capital syndication in the firms’ ability 
to efficiently time the IPO market, as well as the benefits of syndication to the issuing 
firms and venture capitalists. I find a positive, significant relationship between venture 
capital syndication and IPO market timing, using both measures of market timing 
primarily espoused in the literature. All of the models suggest that the syndication of 
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venture capital increases a firm’s ability to time the IPO market, and that the level of such 
syndication contributes positively to this ability. 
As a second analysis of this study, I examine the benefits of syndication and 
efficient IPO market timing, in terms of the firm, as well as the primary and secondary 
markets. I find a positive, and significant, relation between venture capital syndication 
and initial returns. Both the presence of a venture capital syndicate, in addition to the 
level of such syndication, increase the initial returns related to the offering. I also find a 
significant, positive relationship between VC syndication and the extent to which an 
offering ultimately prices above the midpoint of the initial filing range. Finally, the 
results indicate that there is a positive, significant, relationship between syndication and 
the initial filing range. While the results with respect to the relationship between VC 
syndication and initial IPO filing range are different than expected, I offer a theory that 
explains the relationship. 
This paper contributes to the literature in a number of significant ways. First, it 
extends the initial public offering research by examining the effect of venture capital 
syndication on a firm’s ability to efficiently time the new equity market, as well as the 
impact on offering pricing. This is a topic that, to my knowledge, has not been addressed 
in the literature previously. Second, in addition to helping fill the literary gap surrounding 
IPO market timing, this study contributes to the literature by examining the benefits of 
such market timing to issuers, and venture capitalists. A third contribution this work 
makes to the existing literature is that it advances initial public offering market timing 
and pricing as additional benefits of Venture capital syndication. 
 
CHAPTER 2: SEED ACCELERATORS: 
A NEW APPROACH TO FIRM VALUE CREATION 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Venture capital seed accelerators represent a relatively new and development in 
the process of funding young companies. While there have been various forms of 
incubators and other entities that assist in the growth of new firms, the modern form of 
the seed accelerator is a relatively new phenomenon, and are unique in a number of key 
respects. First, seed accelerators are often owned and operated by venture capital firms, 
which changes the dynamics of their relationship with the start-up firm. Second, 
accelerator programs typically offer mentoring to young firms for a few months, which 
forces the firm and venture capitalist to develop and evaluate the costs and benefits of the 
potential venture in a very short time frame. Third, accelerators are unique in that they 
normally admit competitive cohorts of start-ups, rather than working with individual 
companies through the early-stage process.11 
These unique characteristics potentially present a different development path for 
young companies. The early, intense involvement of venture capital firms in the 
development of the start-up potentially alters the growth, structure, and ultimately 
financing of young companies that participate in these programs. In addition, since they 
are operated by, and have evolved at the hands of, venture capital firms themselves,
                                                          
11 They often create open competitions through which entrepreneurs vie for the opportunity to participate in 
the program (Miller and Bound (2011)). 
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accelerators provide a unique view of the effects of venture capital monitoring, 
mentoring, and financial support on the companies they invest in. 
One possible area in which accelerator program participation may have an impact 
on the development cycle of new firms is how they are funded. As has been well 
established in the literature, venture capital has traditionally been analyzed in terms of the 
role it plays in providing financing to firms that might not otherwise be able to obtain 
such funding. (Sahlman (1990); Gompers (1995); and Lerner (1994a). The literature 
develops the primary theories associated with venture capitalists role as financial 
intermediaries, and their function with respect to reducing potential agency costs and 
information asymmetry. 
Central to these theories are the control mechanisms used to ameliorate such 
issues. There are three common control mechanisms described in the literature related to 
venture capital financing: 1) staged capital infusions; 2) the syndication of investments; 
and 3) the use of convertible securities. Of these mechanisms, it has been suggested that 
staged capital funding is the most potent (Sahlman (1990)). The staging of financing 
provided to young companies, provides venture capital firms with the opportunity to 
monitor firm progress and founder actions, gather firm-specific information, and maintain 
an option to abandon projects that do not meet expectations. The monitoring and 
information gathering functions of venture capital firms are at the core of their role as 
financial intermediaries. 
Venture capital organizations have an incentive to make investments in firms as 
early as possible for three primary reasons. First, early investment ensures that they have 
the option to invest in the company in the future, in the presence of a competitive 
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environment for investment companies. Second, venture capital firms can “purchase” the 
opportunity to gather information about project-specific and agency uncertainties that is 
endogenous to the firm. Third, early involvement in the company allows the venture 
capitalist to mentor the owners with respect to their product and company. 
Seed accelerators seem to be designed to serve these interests particularly well. 
They allow the venture capital firm to become intimately acquainted with the new 
company, its product, and its founders as early as possible. This benefit serves a number 
of functions, including monitoring, mentoring, as well as reducing information 
asymmetry. Additionally, the structure of the program provides a financial benefit as 
well. By allowing the venture capitalist, through the accelerator program, to take an 
equity ownership interest in the new company, it ensures that the venture capital firm 
secures an option to participate in the equity of the new company, at a very early stage, 
and at a relatively low cost. 
Despite the increasing importance of seed accelerators in today’s venture capital 
environment, there is little research or literature related to these programs, and more 
particularly, the financial affects they have on the firms they finance. There have been a 
small number of studies analyzing the benefits of seed accelerators to the larger 
community and economy (Miller and Bound (2011)). However, there is a dearth of 
literature related to the firm-level affects. Additionally, to my knowledge, no study has 
investigated the possible effects that these start-up programs have on early-stage 
financing, in particular. 
 45 
In this paper, I explore the effect of seed accelerator program participation on 
subsequent follow-on funding.12  The first goal of this paper is to determine whether 
accelerator participation affects ex post follow-on funding. Since most young firms 
financed by venture capitalists require continued funding to survive and grow, follow-on 
funding is considered a key signal of firm growth and positive expectations of the future. 
Further, the characteristics of such funding is impacted by the health and structure of the 
firm. 
I find that seed accelerator participation is positively related to subsequent follow-
on funding, after controlling for firm characteristics as well as macro-level variables such 
as venture capital market investments, venture capital commitments, and the NASDAQ 
Composite Index. The results indicate that firms that participate in an accelerator 
program are more likely to receive follow-on funding in the three years that follow their 
initial seed funding. To my knowledge this paper offers the first findings related to this 
aspect of the start-up funding, and the benefits of accelerator programs in this regard. 
After finding that a significant relationship exists between accelerator program 
participation and follow-on funding, a second goal of this paper is to examine how the 
characteristics of the follow-on funding differ between accelerator participants and non-
accelerated firms. If accelerator programs offer benefits, one would expect that they 
would continue through the early-stage financing of the firm. I study the total amount 
raised, the amount of individual rounds, as well as the number and time between such 
rounds, during the three years following initial seed funding. I find that the follow-on 
funding of accelerated firms exhibits favorable characteristics, as compared to firms that 
                                                          
12 Follow-on funding is defined as any financing received by the firm after the date of the initial seed 
funding, and includes equity and debt financing. 
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did not participate in such a program. Specifically, I find a significant, positive 
relationship between accelerator program participation and the total amount of follow-on 
funding raised. The results show that firms that attend such a program raise more funds 
during the three years following such participation. In addition, I find a positive 
relationship between the average amount of individual funding rounds, as well as the 
average time between funding rounds, and accelerator participation. Finally, I document a 
negative relationship between the number of funding rounds and accelerator 
participation. After examining the relationship between accelerator participation and 
follow-on funding, as well as the characteristics of such funding, I explore possible 
causes of such findings, and present three hypotheses for the findings. 
This study adds to the extant literature in a number of important ways. First, the 
research fills a large gap related to one of the newest funding vehicles, venture capital 
seed accelerators. It provides an examination of the effects of participation in these 
programs on one of the most important metrics for young firm success, follow-on 
funding. To my knowledge, this study stands alone in this regard, as there has been no 
literature related to the firm-level affects of these funding programs. This is important for 
entrepreneurs, start-up firms, venture capitalists, and investors because it sheds light on 
how the amount of funding and financing characteristics of early-stage companies are 
impacted by accelerator participation. 
Second, this study adds to the literature in that it provides a foundation from 
which to examine the long-term effects of accelerator programs on the firms they finance, 
as they mature into larger private and public companies. At the rate these programs are 
growing, they stand to impact a significant number of new companies. This paper 
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provides a foundation for studying how these new funding tools influence important firm 
characteristics, such as financing, capital structure, and corporate governance. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the 
relevant literature and provides my hypotheses. Section 2.3 describes the data and sample 
selection. Section 2.4 presents the methodology and empirical results. Section 2.5 
concludes. 
2.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses 
2.2.1 Venture Capital’s Role in Growing Young Companies 
The benefits of venture capital to the growth of young firms, job creation, and 
economic growth as a whole is well-documented (Dushnitsky and Lenox (2006)). A 
primary function of venture capital firms is the role they play as a financial intermediary, 
providing capital to firms that might not otherwise by able to attract funding. These firms 
are often early-stage, technology-related companies that have a high degree of 
uncertainty. Specifically, there are two primary concerns with respect to these types of 
young firms. First, they often have a high degree of information asymmetry, due to firm-
specific uncertainty related to the potential costs and benefits associated with the 
company’s projects. Second, there are potential agency conflicts related to the decisions 
of the founders. The function performed by the venture capitalist is based primarily on 
reducing the uncertainties that are endogenous to the firm, and the resulting barriers to 
financing that these companies face in the financial marketplace. 
With respect to information asymmetry, Gompers (1995) suggests that venture 
capitalists specifically concentrate investments in early-stage, technology-related 
companies where information asymmetries are the highest. These financial intermediaries 
 48 
create relationships that are structured in a way that allows them to gather relevant firm-
specific information. Barry, et al. (1990) further find results consistent with the theory 
that venture capitalists specialize their investments in firms where they can provide 
intensive monitoring services in an effort to ameliorate potential agency conflicts. 
To address the uncertainties associated with early-stage firms, venture capitalists 
use a number of control mechanisms. The three primary tools used are: 1) Staged-capital 
infusions, 2) syndication of investments, and 3) funding contract-related controls such as 
convertible securities. How these mechanisms are used by venture capitalists has been 
widely examined (Sahlman (1990); Gompers (1995); Gompers and Lerner (2004)). Of 
the different tools used by venture capitalist, it has been suggested that staged-financing 
is the most effective. (Sahlman (1990)). 
Staged funding serves a number of functions in the relationship between venture 
capitalist and the young firms they finance. First, it reduces both information asymmetry 
and potential agency conflicts by facilitating frequent monitoring of the firm. Requiring 
that a financed company seek frequent funding, and more importantly the reevaluation 
involved at the time of the new funding round, keeps the founder on a tight leash 
(Gompers and Lerner (2004)). This monitoring of firm progress at the time a decision 
whether to provide further funding is made, is the primary review of nascent companies 
(Gompers (1995)).13 
A second primary function staged funding serves relates to the options held by the 
venture capital firm. Requiring the company to seek frequent financing rounds reduces 
losses from poor decisions on the part of the venture capitalist (Gompers and Lerner 
                                                          
13 Gorman and Sahlman (1989) find that, between rounds of funding, lead venture capitalists visit 
entrepreneurs approximately once per month on average, spending about four or five hours at the 
company during each visit. In addition, they are provided with monthly financial reports. 
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(2001)). Venture capitalists maintain the option to not provide funding if, after gathering 
information, it appears there is little probability of the company going public or enjoying 
some other profitable exit (Gompers (1995)). 
Li (2008) examines this option in greater detail, and suggests that the decision 
whether to extend further financing to a firm is a real option. Specifically, the venture 
capitalist has the choice to either invest additional funds, or hold the option to invest until 
further information can be obtained. When to exercise the option is a balance between the 
incentive to wait to invest until exogenous, market-based uncertainty is resolved over 
time, and the motive to invest sooner to obtain information about uncertainty that is 
endogenous to the firm (Li (2008)). Li notes that, since often project-specific information 
is gathered primarily when investment in the firm is taking place, venture capital 
organizations have an incentive to invest now, so they can obtain information regarding 
project-specific uncertainty. Learning about the potential costs and benefits associated 
with a firm and its operations, through investing in the firm, is a key method of 
controlling information asymmetry and agency conflicts, used by venture capitalists. The 
running costs of staged, ongoing investment facilitate the accumulation of information, 
which informs the intermediary’s option to fund the company further, or abandon the 
project. 
It is also well established in the extant literature that venture capital organizations 
serve a specialized role beyond providing pecuniary assistance. Venture capitalists act as 
mentors, monitors, and networkers, while maintaining a close relationship with the firms 
they fund. To that end, Keuschnigg (2004) finds that venture capitalists not only finance, 
but also advise and bring value to portfolio firms, as well as the economy as a whole, 
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through boosted innovation-based growth. Kanniainen and Keuschnigg (2003) suggests 
that venture capitalists, represent “informed capital,” and screen and advise start-up 
entrepreneurs. This non-pecuniary assistance benefits both the venture capitalist and the 
founders, as they share at least some common interests in the success of the firm. Barry, 
et al. (1990) further establish that venture capital firms serve on the board of portfolios 
companies, and provide benefits to young firms beyond funding. Hellman and Puri 
(2002) further examine empirical evidence from a hand-collected data set related to 
technology startups to ascertain the impact of venture capitalists on the development path 
of new firms. Their findings suggest that venture capital involvement provides benefits in 
terms of helping companies increase human resources, and other types of company 
development. 
2.2.2 Seed Accelerator Programs 
An analysis of seed accelerator programs must begin with the fact that they are a 
product of the evolution of the business incubator, which has existed for a number of 
decades. Business incubators, like accelerators, provide business services such as office 
space, facilities, telecommunications systems, as well as advice and other knowledge-
based services. 
Grimaldi, Rosa, and Grandi (2005) provide a survey of the types of incubators. 
While the study was conducted prior to the advent of the modern seed accelerator, it 
provides a helpful outline of the evolution of business incubators. The work provides a 
framework for the evolution of the incubator concept, which has lead to the advent of 
accelerators. Grimaldi, Rosa, and Alessandro Grandi (2005) identified four types of 
incubators: Business Innovation Centers, University Business Incubators, Independent 
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Private Incubators, and Corporate Private Incubators. They also suggest that the evolution 
of incubator business models has been driven by changing company requirements and 
needs. Based on this overriding idea, the study differentiates the types of incubators into 
two categories based on the range of services offered. The first of these two categories, 
which can be thought of as framing each end of a spectrum of business models, are 
Business Innovation Centers and Regional Public Incubators. These organizations are 
oriented towards providing tangible assets and market commodities, and allow companies 
to benefit from access to large-scale physical assets and support at a low cost. 
On the other end of the spectrum are Independent Private Incubators and 
Corporate Private Incubators. These organizations focus on the provision of financing 
and more intangible, high-value assets. They often offer technological support and a 
readily-available network of knowledge based services, which have become increasingly 
important for start-ups over the past two decades. This second category of business 
incubators also operate based on a shorter time-frame in how they serve start-ups. 
According to the study, University Business Incubators can be found somewhere 
between these two ends of business services. The paper suggests that University Business 
Incubators are similar to Business Innovation Centers in that they rely on fees and public 
subsidies. Their objective, however, is different. Their primary focus is to provide 
businesses with access to technological knowledge and other human-capital infrastructure 
available at universities. They differ from Business Innovation Centers in that they do not 
tend to be less time-sensitive. Finally, the authors readily acknowledge that there is a 
wide-range of other business models, each lying somewhere on this spectrum. 
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Hansen, et al. (2000) analyze whether business incubators were a fleeting 
phenomenon or a lasting method of funding start-ups. Their conclusions suggest that 
networked incubators play an increasing role in start-up finance because they provided a 
benefit that neither large corporations, nor venture capitalists could offer: Value through 
preferential network access, the fostering of entrepreneurial drive, and economies of 
scale. More particularly, incubators offer entrepreneurial benefits, which is an element 
that large companies struggle to maintain. Interestingly the paper also suggests that, 
unlike venture capitalists, startup incubators are able to provide an increased level of 
organized network benefits. Numerous other studies have examined the effects of 
business incubators on the financial aspects of businesses, including a number of studies 
that find that start-ups that participate in business incubators are more successful in the 
long-term. 
The extant literature related to incubators, however, does not include analysis of 
seed accelerators, which is a more recent incarnation of business services organizations. 
Created as an evolutionary extension of the traditional business incubator, the modern 
seed accelerator shares some, but not all, of the characteristics of the incubator. For 
example, like incubators, seed accelerator programs often provide office space, business 
advice, and other knowledge-based services. They, however, differ from their incubator 
counterparts in a number of key ways. 
First, accelerators are often owned and operated by venture capital firms. 
Therefore, from the outset the goals of the organization are different from the traditional 
incubator. An extension of this difference is the fact that accelerators often provide short-
term funding to the start-ups they accept into the program. This funding typically is 
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accompanied with an agreement that the venture capital accelerator acquire an interest in 
the venture (Miller and Bound (2011)). The equity interest in the company forms a 
different type of relationship with the young firm, and is the basis of the option held by 
the venture capitalist. This differs markedly from traditional incubators, which normally 
do not play an ownership role in the companies they support. 
A second primary distinction between business incubators and venture capital 
accelerators is the time-frame within which they operate. Seed accelerators initially 
provide time-limited support. Whereas companies participating in an incubator program 
often have no set time-frame limitations on their relationship, accelerators seek to turn 
business ideas into viable businesses based on a very short, intense, time schedule. 
Although the venture capital firm often continues to fund the business that participated in 
the accelerator, typically the accelerator program itself often lasts for only a few months 
(Miller and Bound (2011)). 
A third characteristic unique to accelerators is their focus on teamwork. They 
normally admit cohorts or classes of start-ups, rather than individual companies. All of 
the founders in a cohort enter at the same time, and leave the program at the same time. 
Additionally, accelerators focus on small teams of founders, rather than individual 
founders (Miller and Bound (2011)). As a part of the application process founder teams 
are often required to include individuals that are skilled in different aspects of the start-
up. This likely plays a key role in increasing the likelihood of firm success. 
A final primary difference between business incubators and seed accelerator 
programs is the process of choosing start-ups to support. Accelerators are highly-
competitive. They often create a competition through which entrepreneurs vie for the 
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opportunity to participate in the program (Miller and Bound (2011)). While traditional 
incubators typically have an application process and there are frequently limited 
resources available for a small number of firms, it is normally not presented as a 
competition. 
While, to my knowledge, there has been no literature analyzing the firm-level 
benefits of accelerator programs, one study should be noted. Kim and Wagman (2012) 
study accelerator programs, and their findings suggest possible inefficiencies in equity 
fees, class size, information shared with investor, and the process of granting 
entrepreneurs access to investors. They suggest that seed accelerators choose a class size 
that is too small relative to the social optimum. The authors also point out that this 
inefficiency can be mitigated by providing an entrepreneur-in-residence. Kim and 
Wagman (2012), however, focuses on seed accelerator programs, rather than the firms 
they fund. 
2.2.3 Seed Accelerator Programs as a New Path of Venture Capital Funding 
Venture capital organizations play an important role as financial intermediaries, 
by providing funding, as well as mentoring, to young firms that otherwise might not be 
able to obtain this type of assistance. To ameliorate information asymmetry and agency 
concerns in the relationship between the venture capitalist and the firms it invests in, a 
number of techniques are used. One of the most effective of these tools is that of staged-
funding rounds, because it requires that the firm undergo periodic reevaluation. During 
the process of reexamining the firm, before making the decision to extend further 
financing, venture capital companies learn about the potential costs and benefits 
associated with the company, its operations, and its founders. 
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The initial investment in a company provides the venture capitalist with a 
preliminary option to retain an ongoing equity interest in the firm. The initial investment 
in the company gives the financer time to evaluate the firm’s product or service, and its 
owners. Ongoing, staged capital infusions provide the financer with a renewing option to 
provide further funding, wait to extend financing, or abandon the project. The dual 
motives of acquiring/preserving the option to invest in the company in the future, and 
obtaining project-specific information, result in an incentive for the venture capital firm 
to invest in the firm as early as possible. Further, competition among venture capital 
organizations to identify new firms to invest in, puts pressure on them to find start-ups at 
a young age. 
This paper examines seed accelerators as a tool developed by venture capitalists 
to assist in their efforts to evaluate, acquire an interest in, mentor, and monitor young 
company that have a high degree of uncertainty. To fully consider the impact of these 
funding vehicles, it is important to understand how an accelerator operates. The 
acceleration process sheds light on how these new funding vehicles benefit firms and 
their financers. 
Seed accelerator programs accept applications from prospective firms that are 
interested in entering the program. From these applications the program chooses a cohort, 
or class, of entering firms. The application process if open, yet highly competitive. Only a 
small number of start-sup are chosen for each class. At this stage, the accelerator is 
primarily looking for two components in an ideal candidate: a great idea, and a team of 
founders that seems able to accomplish their goal. 
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Once the class of firms is chosen, they typically relocate to the geographic area 
where the accelerator is located. Since the acceleration process involves intense 
mentoring and monitoring, it is imperative that the firm be onsite through the process. 
The seed accelerator program provides initial seed funding to the firm. Depending on the 
policies of the program, the seed funding is normally based either on a fixed amount, or a 
sliding scale depending on the number of founders. Accelerator seed funding normally 
ranges from $7,500 to $100,000 per firm, with approximately $20,000 being the average. 
The seed funds are contributed to the start-up in exchange for a small ownership interest 
in the company. This equity ownership share is typically between 2% and 10% of the 
firm. 
During the course of the accelerator program, the firms attend focused events that 
are designed to help them develop their ideas, focus their resources, and produce a 
product or service. Since the programs are time-limited, there is intense pressure among 
the firms to succeed. At the end of the program, which typically last two to three months, 
the firms pitch their product or service to a group of investors, in what is called “Demo 
Day.” Often these investors include both venture capitalists from within the accelerator 
program, and investors that are not directly connected with the program. Following the 
presentation of their product/service, the companies negotiate further funding. 
Since often founders have little more than an idea when they enter the accelerator 
program, this is the earliest opportunity for venture capitalists to become intimately 
involved with the firm. I hypothesize that this early involvement helps both the firm and 
venture capitalist in a number of important ways. For example, the intense program 
process should help firms develop their ideas and grow quickly. It offers a chance for 
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product and founder mentoring and monitoring, before both have proceeded very far in 
the development of the company. In this way, the venture capital firm can play an 
integral role in shaping the firm into a viable going concern, and one that they can 
provide funding support for in the future. 
Based on this relationship, one would expect that accelerator program 
participation would alter the funding cycle of the young company. One way that such 
funding may be changed is the likelihood that a start-up firm ultimately receives follow-
on funding.14 While the success of a young firm can be measured using a number of 
metrics, in the financial industry follow-on funding is widely-considered the best measure 
of early-stage success, and serves as a signal as to the investor’s perspective of the future 
of the company. The continued endorsement of the company, through further funding, is 
one of the best way to gauge whether it has been successful up to that point. This logic 
leads to the following hypothesis: 
H1: Seed accelerator participation increases the likelihood that a firm will receive 
follow-on funding during the three years following initial seed financing.15 
After examining whether a relationship exists between seed accelerator 
participation and follow-on funding, I explore the characteristics of such funding. Again, 
if the early, intense involvement of the venture capital firm in the product development, 
firm structure, and overall growth process of the company impacts the relationship 
between the firm and its financers, one would expect that the characteristics of the follow 
on funding would differ for firms that participated in an accelerator program when 
                                                          
14 Follow-On Funding is defined as any funding received by the firm after the initial seed funding round, 
including both equity and debt financing. 
15 I limit my analysis to three years following seed funding because it is expected that the impact of seed 
accelerator participation diminishes over time. 
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compared to companies that did not. To examine this issue I evaluate four follow-on 
funding characteristics related to the early-stage financing structure for young start-up 
companies. 
First, I examine whether the total amount raised by the firm, during the three 
years that follow initial seed funding, differs between companies that participate in 
accelerators and firms that do not. It is expected that firms that participate in a seed 
accelerator program raise a larger total amount of follow-on funding in the years that 
follow such participation. This suggests the following hypothesis: 
H2: Seed accelerator participation increases the total amount of follow-on funding 
raised by the firm during the three years following initial seed financing. 
Second, I test whether accelerator program participation results in a change in the 
average size of the individual funding rounds. A positive relationship between the 
maturity of the firm and the size of funding rounds has been well documented in the 
literature (Gompers and Lerner 2004). If accelerator participation benefits the firm in 
terms of its growth, one would expect that these firms would exhibit a difference in the 
size of their early-stage funding rounds. 
In addition, staged capital infusions serve as an effective control mechanism to 
ameliorate both information asymmetry and potential agency conflicts. Therefore, if 
accelerator program participation reduces these concerns, one would expect that firms 
that participate in such programs would receive larger individual rounds of funding. This 
logic leads to the following hypothesis: 
H3: Seed accelerator participation increases the amount of individual follow-on 
funding rounds during the three years following initial seed financing. 
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Third, building on the above ideas, if accelerated firms receive larger amounts of 
funding, in larger individual rounds, these early-stage firms would be expected to raise 
fewer rounds of funding overall. This suggests the following hypothesis: 
H4: Seed accelerator participation decreases the number of follow-on funding 
rounds during the three years following seed funding. 
Lastly, I turn to the issue of whether accelerator participation affects the time 
between funding rounds of accelerator participants. Gompers (1995) suggests that there is 
an inverse relationship between duration of funding, as a measure of the intensity of 
monitoring, and expected agency costs. If seed accelerator participation decreases agency 
conflicts, as well as information asymmetry, resulting in an increased size of the 
individual funding rounds a firm receives, this would be expected to be reflected in the 
duration of funding associated with the firms that participate in these programs. This 
leads to the following hypothesis: 
H5: Seed accelerator participation increases the time between follow-on funding 
rounds during the three years following initial seed financing. 
After examining the relationship between accelerator participation and follow-on 
funding, as well as the characteristics of such funding, I suggest three possible causes of 
such findings, based on benefits to both the firm and venture capitalist. 
2.3 Data and Sample Selection 
The primary data for this study is a unique data sample, initially consisting of 
105,034 technology-related firms from Crunchbase.16 The data was collected through an 
                                                          
16 It is well-established in the literature that, on average, more than seventy percent of venture capital 
investments are in high technology firms (e.g., communication, computers, electronics, biotechnology, 
and medical/health) (Gompers (1995)). Therefore the Crunchbase sample lends itself to examining 
funding within the venture capital industry. 
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API agreement with CrunchBase, and includes corporate, product, executive, and 
financial data for both companies and accelerator programs. The sample provides a 
detailed picture of the structure and characteristics of early-stage venture capital 
investments, including the amount and timing of seed and follow-on funding rounds, 
investor information, and firm characteristics such as date of founding, age of founders, 
and location of firm. 
Venture capital firm data is collected from VentureXpert. Data related to industry-
wide venture capital investments is collected from the National Venture Capital 
Association. This data includes both the total amount invested, as well as the number of 
deals, both per quarter for the venture capital industry as a whole.  The total amount of 
investor commitments made to venture capital firms as well as investments by region, per 
quarter, is also collected from the National Venture Capital Association. Quarterly 
average NASDAQ Composite Index is used as a further macroeconomic-level control 
variable. For each of the venture capital investments and commitments, as well as the 
NASDAQ Composite Index, I create an index based on the first quarter of 2005 as the 
base year. 
Since the scope of this study is focused primarily on the effect of accelerator 
program participation on follow-on funding, I restrict the data sample to firms for which 
funding rounds, and other pertinent information is available. After removing firms that 
lack needed information, as well as those that received seed funding prior 2005 and after 
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2010, the selection process yields 7,419 firms that received seed funding between 2005 
and 2010.17 
The overall sample includes 1,712 firms that participated in 63 different venture 
capital accelerator programs, and 5,707 firms that did not participate in such a seed 
accelerator program.18 1,341 of the accelerated firms are based in the United States, while 
3,908 of the non-accelerated companies are U.S. Firms. Table 10 provides a breakdown 
of seed accelerator programs by country, while Table 11 provides the distribution of the 
firms attending such programs by country. 
I also create a sample of matching, non-accelerated, firms for each accelerated 
firm. The firms are first matched based on the date of seed funding, and second based on 
the amount of seed funding, both by quarter. The firm with the closest match for each of 
these criteria is used. This process produces a final sample of 3,424 matched firms. 
Finally, to examine the characteristics of follow-on funding rounds, I also create a 
sample consisting solely of matched pairs of firms that received funding during the three  
years following seed funding. Each match includes one firm that attended an accelerator 
and one that did not. The matching process here is the same as described above, first 
based on the date of seed funding, and second according to the amount of such funding. 
The sample of firms that received follow-on funding, for funding characteristic analysis, 
consists of a total of 1,226 matched firms that received follow-on funding in the three 
years following initial financing. 
 
                                                          
17 Because I test the relationship between seed accelerator participation and follow-on funding, during 
the three years following initial seed funding, as well as the characteristics of such funding, I limit the 
sample to firms that received initial seed funding on or before December 31, 2010. 
18 For the purposes of this study, I have defined an accelerator as a fixed-term, cohort-based program that 
offers seed funding and mentorship, in exchange for an equity interest in the firm. 
 62 
TABLE 10: Frequency distribution of seed accelerator programs by country 
This table reports the frequency of seed accelerator programs by country, as well as the 
percentage of the total number of seed accelerator programs in the sample. A Seed 
Accelerator Program must invest in companies in exchange for equity, at the seed stage, 
have cohorts or classes, provide a program of support for such cohorts, and have an open 
application process. The sample size is 63 seed accelerator programs. The sample is 
collected from Crunchbase. 
 
Country Frequency   Percent 
    Argentina 1 
 
1.59% 
Belgiam 1 
 
1.59% 
Canada 4 
 
6.35% 
China 1 
 
50.00% 
Czech 
Republic 1 
 
1.59% 
Denmark 1 
 
1.59% 
Finalnd 1 
 
1.59% 
Egypt 1 
 
1.59% 
Great Britain 7 
 
11.11% 
India 1 
 
1.59% 
Italy 4 
 
6.35% 
Japan 1 
 
50.00% 
Netherlands 1 
 
1.59% 
Singapore 1 
 
1.59% 
South Africa 1 
 
1.59% 
Spain 2 
 
3.17% 
Thailand 1 
 
1.59% 
Ukrain 1 
 
1.59% 
United States 32   50.79% 
    Total 63   
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TABLE 11: Distribution of seed accelerator-participating firms by country 
This table reports the frequency and percentage of firms that attended a seed accelerator 
program during the sample period, by country. The sample is collected from Crunchbase. 
Country Frequency   Percent 
    Argentina 19 
 
1.11% 
Australia 13 
 
0.76% 
Austria 8 
 
0.47% 
Bahrian 1 
 
0.06% 
Belgium 2 
 
0.12% 
Brazil 9 
 
0.52% 
Canada 43 
 
2.50% 
Chile 3 
 
0.17% 
China 4 
 
0.23% 
Czech 
Republic 2 
 
0.12% 
Denmark 7 
 
0.41% 
Egypt 5 
 
0.29% 
Estonia 4 
 
0.23% 
Finalnd 1 
 
0.06% 
France 12 
 
0.70% 
Germany 39 
 
2.27% 
Ghana 5 
 
0.29% 
Great Britain 56 
 
3.26% 
India 8 
 
0.47% 
Indonesia 1 
 
0.06% 
Ireland 10 
 
0.58% 
Israel 4 
 
0.23% 
Italy 44 
 
2.56% 
Jordan 1 
 
0.06% 
Lebanon 2 
 
0.12% 
Latvia 2 
 
0.06% 
Lithuania 1 
 
0.06% 
Malaysia 1 
 
0.06% 
Mexico 3 
 
0.17% 
Netherlands 23 
 
1.34% 
Nigeria 1 
 
0.06% 
Poland 1 
 
0.06% 
Portugal 1 
 
0.06% 
Singapore 16 
 
0.93% 
South Africa 1 
 
0.06% 
Spain 13 
 
0.76% 
Sweden 3 
 
0.17% 
Switzerland 1 
 
0.06% 
Turkey 1 
 
0.06% 
Ukrain 3 
 
0.17% 
United States 1341 
 
78.10% 
Uruguay 2   0.12% 
    Total 1717     
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Table 12 reports descriptive statistics related to the preliminary data, as well as 
the matched-firms sample. Panel A reports firm-specific characteristics. Statistics related 
to whether firms received follow-on funding is provided in Panel B. Differences in the 
amount of seed and follow-on funding is reflected in Panels C and D. Panel E and F 
provide statistics related to the number and timing of individual follow-on funding 
rounds, respectively. 
2.4 Methodology and Empirical Results 
2.4.1 Seed Accelerator Program Impact on Follow-on Funding 
According to the literature venture capital organizations have an incentive to 
make investments and become involved in firms as early as possible for three primary 
reasons. First, venture capital firms can “purchase” the opportunity to gather information 
about project-specific and founder uncertainty that is endogenous to the firm. Second, 
investment ensures that they have the option to invest in the company in the future, in the 
presence of a competitive environment for start-up companies. Third, involvement in the 
company allows the venture capitalist to mentor the owners with respect to their product, 
as well as business operations. In this section I examine whether investment in firms  
through venture capital-created accelerator programs results in the firms having a higher 
likelihood of receiving follow-on funding, as well as the characteristics of such funding, 
when compared to firms that have not participated in such a program. 
Table 12 reports descriptive statistics related to the firms in the matched sample. 
The statistics in Panel B suggest that accelerated firms enjoy a higher likelihood of 
receiving follow-on funding, when compared to their non-accelerated counterparts. In the 
sample, 35% of firms that participated in an accelerator program received follow-on 
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TABLE 12: Descriptive statistics related to matched seed accelerator- 
participating firms 
 
This table reports descriptive statistics related to the matched sample of firms that 
attended an accelerator program. The data is collected from Crunchbase. The sample is 
split into two groups: Firms that attended a seed accelerator program, and those that did 
not. The sample is further into two subcategories: United States firms, and firms from all 
countries. Panel A reports the mean and median of key firm characteristics. Panel B 
presents the follow-on funding characteristics. Panel C reports the seed and follow-on 
funding round amounts. Panel D presents Seed and follow-on funding round amounts. 
Panel E reports the characteristics of the individual funding rounds of the firms in the 
sample. Panel F reports the follow-on funding round timing. 
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funding, as compared to 28% for firms that did not attend such a program. When 
comparing only the United States firms, 39% of accelerated firms received follow-on 
funding, whereas only 33% of non-accelerate firms received such funding. 
Table 12 also presents results related to the amount of funding accelerated and 
non-accelerated firms receive, respectively. Panel C suggests that, while accelerated 
firms on average receive a much smaller amount of initial seed funding, they ultimately 
are able to raise a larger amount of follow-on funding during the first three years. These 
findings hold for firms from the United States, as well as those from the sample of all 
countries. Non-accelerated firms receive, on average, $28,000 more in initial seed 
funding then their accelerated counterparts. Despite this additional initial funding, the 
accelerated firms receive 21% more follow-on funding in the three years that follow. In 
fact, in each of the rounds of financing that follows the initial seed round, the accelerated 
firms receive a significantly larger amount of funding. 
As is reflected in Panels E and F of Table 12, differences in the number of rounds 
and the timing of such rounds indicate that the financing associated with accelerated 
firms is also more favorable. Accelerated firms seem to have longer durations between 
rounds, as well as fewer rounds during the three years following seed funding, on 
average. These preliminary findings are consistent with the theory that accelerator 
programs provide venture capitalists with a benefit that results in favorable financing in 
the years that follow participation in a program. 
To further analyze the relationship between seed accelerator participation and 
early-stage firm funding, I use multivariate regression analysis. My research is split into 
two primary parts. I first examine whether seed accelerator participation affects ex post 
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follow-on funding. Based on the characteristics of accelerator programs, one would 
expect that participation would increase the likelihood that a firm ultimately receives 
follow-on funding. 
After finding that a significant relationship exists between accelerator program 
participation and follow-on funding, I turn to an analysis of the characteristics of the 
follow-on funding received by accelerated firms, as compared to that raised by 
companies that did not attend an accelerator program. If these programs offer benefits, 
one would expect that such benefits continue through the early-stage financing of the 
firms, and can be observed in the characteristics of the follow-on funding. 
2.4.2 The Relationship Between Seed Accelerator Program Participation 
and Follow-on Funding 
 
In this section, I examine the impact of accelerator participation on the binary 
dependent variable representing receipt of follow-on funding. The goal is to determine 
whether Seed Accelerator participation affects a firm’s ex post follow-on funding during 
the first three years following initial seed funding, based on the following hypothesis: 
H1: Seed accelerator participation increases the likelihood that a firm will receive 
follow-on funding during the three years following initial seed financing. 
To examine this relationship, I use a multivariate regression model based on the 
equation of following the form: 
success measurei = f(accelerator participationi, control variablesi) 
 
In this system, success measurei represents the binary dependent dummy variable 
indicating whether the firm obtained follow-on funding within the three years following 
initial seed funding. The primary explanatory variable of interest, Accelerator 
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participationi represents a dummy variable based on whether the firm participated in a 
seed accelerator program. 
To capture firm-specific characteristics, I select a set of control variables 
including venture capital quality rank of the firm, location rank of the firm, age of the 
firm, and average age of the founders. I use venture capital commitments, venture capital 
investments, and the NASDAQ Composite Index to control for venture capital industry 
and mac-economic factors. The model also controls for time effects in the system. 
More specifically, I regress the follow-on funding dependent variable on the seed 
accelerator participation dummy variable, and control variables, using a probit model, as 
follows: 
Follow-On Fundingi = α + β1 x Accelerator Participationi   (1) 
+ β2 x VC Quality Ranki,t-1 + β3 x Location Ranki,t-1 
+ β4 x Founder Agei,t + β5 x Age of Firm (months)t 
+ β6 x VC Commitments Indexi, t-1 + β7 x VC Market Investments Indexi,t-1 
+ β8 x NASDAQ Indexi,t-1 + εi 
 
where, Follow-On Fundingi denotes whether the individual firm received follow-
on funding during the three years following initial seed funding. A one indicates that the 
firm received follow-on funding, while a zero represents that the firm did not receive 
such funding. Accelerator Participationi represents the primary explanatory variable of 
interest, and denotes a dummy variable of one if the firm participated in a seed 
accelerator, and zero if the firm did not participate in such a program. VC Quality Ranki,t-1 
denotes a ranking of the lead venture capital firm, as of the end of the quarter preceding 
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seed funding. Venture capital quality is thought to be a determinant of early-stage firm 
success (Megginson and Weiss (1991)). The venture capital firm ranking is created based 
on the amount of funds invested in start-up companies during the three years preceding 
the funding of the instant firm, using data collected from VentureXpert. This quarterly 
ranking is used in the regressions to account for differences among venture capital 
firms.19 Location Rankt,t-1 denotes the rank of the location of the individual firm, as of the 
end of the quarter following seed funding. This is a quarterly ranking of locations, based 
on the amount of venture capital investment by region, as compiled from the National 
Venture Capital Association. This ranking is used in the regressions to account for 
difference in investment across locations of individual firms. This data is unavailable for 
all countries. Therefore, it is included in regressions of the sample of United States firms 
only. The variable is not included in regressions of the sample including firms from 
countries other than the United States. Founder Agei,t denotes the average age of the 
founders involved in the individual firm at the time of seed funding. Age of Firmi,t 
denotes the age of the firm at the time of seed funding. VC Commitments Indexi,t-1 
denotes the new capital commitments to venture capital companies by outside investors 
in the quarter preceding seed funding for the individual firm, as compiled by the National 
Association of Venture Capital.20 The Index is calculated using the first quarter of 2005 
as the base time period. Table A provides details related to the VC Capital Commitments 
Index for each quarter in the sample. VC Investments Indexi,t-1 denotes the level of 
venture capital investments in the quarter preceding the firm’s seed funding. I use 
                                                          
19 A rank of the venture capital firms is also calculated using the number of venture capital investments in 
the three years prior to the seed investment, with results that do not significantly differ from the results 
herein. 
20  For the purposes of this study, “capital commitments,” “fundraising,” and “fund closes” are used 
interchangeably. Compiled by the National Venture Capital Association, from Thomson Reuters data. 
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National Venture Capital Association data to calculate a venture capital investments 
index, with the first quarter of 2005 serving as the base time period. Table B provides 
details related to the VC Investments Index for each quarter in the sample. NASDAQ 
Indexi,t-1 denotes the average NASDAQ Composite Index in the quarter preceding seed 
funding of the individual firm. For consistency with the other control variables, the 
NASDAQ Composite Index is converted into an index using the first quarter of 2005 as 
the base time period. 
 The base multivariate regression is run on the sample of all, unmatched, firms. To 
ensure that the change in follow-on funding does not stem from location and VC quality, 
Model 2 includes the location rank, and Model 3 includes both location rank and VC 
Quality Rank, in the regressions related to US firms. Only VC Quality Rank is included 
in the regressions of the sample of firms from all countries, because location rankings are  
not available for all countries. Table 13 reports the marginal effects of the probit 
regression of follow-on funding on accelerator participation, firm characteristics 
variables, and controls for venture capital industry and macroeconomic effects.21 In all 
three models the coefficient on the primary variable of interest, the dummy variable 
indicating whether the firm participated in a seed accelerator, is positive and statistically 
significant. Consistent with my hypothesis, accelerator program participation has a 
positive impact on whether a start-up receives follow-on funding, in the three years 
following initial seed funding. 
 
 
                                                          
21 The marginal effects for each independent variable in Tables 5 and 6 are calculated holding all other 
independent variables at their mean values. 
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TABLE 13: Base regressions of follow-on funding on accelerator participation 
with all firms in sample 
 
This table reports the probit regression results of regressions of follow-on funding on 
accelerator participation, as well as the control variables, with the data sample of all 
firms.  The sample includes 5,343 firms in the U.S. only sample, and 7,524 firms in the 
sample from all countries. In this regression specification, Follow-On Funding is a 
dummy variable, and denotes whether the individual firm received follow-on funding 
during the three years following initial seed funding. A one indicates that the firm 
received follow-on funding, while a zero represents that the firm did not receive such 
funding. Accelerator Participation represents the primary explanatory variable of 
interest, and denotes a dummy variable of one if the firm participated in a seed 
accelerator, and zero if the firm did not participate in such a program. VC Quality Rank 
denotes a ranking of the lead venture capital firm, as of the end of the quarter preceding 
seed funding. The venture capital firm ranking is created based on the amount of funds 
invested in start-up companies during the three years preceding the funding of the instant 
firm, using data collected from VentureXpert. Location Rank denotes the rank of the 
location of the individual firm, as of the end of the quarter following seed funding. This is 
a quarterly ranking of locations, based on the amount of venture capital investment by 
region, as compiled from the National Venture Capital Association. This data is 
unavailable for all countries. Therefore, the Location Rank variable is included in 
regressions of the sample of United States firms only. The variable is not included in 
regressions of the sample including firms from countries other than the United States. 
Founder Age denotes the average age of the founders involved in the individual firm at 
the time of seed funding. Age of Firm denotes the age of the firm at the time of seed 
funding. VC Commitments Index denotes the new capital commitments to venture capital 
companies by outside investors in the quarter preceding seed funding for the individual 
firm, as compiled by the National Association of Venture Capital. The Index is calculated 
using the first quarter of 2005 as the base time period. Table A provides details related to 
the VC Capital Commitments Index for each quarter in the sample. VC Investments Index 
denotes the level of venture capital investments in the quarter preceding the firm’s seed 
funding. I use National Venture Capital Association data to calculate a venture capital 
investments index, with the first quarter of 2005 serving as the base time period. Table B 
provides details related to the VC Investments Index for each quarter in the sample. 
NASDAQ Index denotes the average NASDAQ Composite Index in the quarter preceding 
seed funding of the individual firm. For consistency with the other control variables, the 
NASDAQ Composite Index is converted into an index using the first quarter of 2005 as 
the base time period. Year dummies are included in the specification, but not reported. Z-
Scores are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 13: Continued 
      USA   All Countries 
      Model 1 Model 2 Model 3   Model 1 Model 2 
         
 
Accelerator Participation 0.0413** 0.0343** .0308** 
 
.0239** .0219* 
   
(2.07) (2.27) (2.43) 
 
(2.12) (1.67) 
Firm Characteristic Variables 
      
 
Average Founders Age 
(Years) .0047* .0045* .0038 
 
.0016 .0016 
   
(1.12) (1.56) (1.38) 
 
(1.61) (1.12) 
 
Age of Firm (Years) .0213** .0183** .0108* 
 
.0061** .0061* 
   
(2.49) (2.07) (1.72) 
 
(2.12) (1.77) 
 
Location Rank 
  
.0179** .0153** 
   
    
(2.31) (2.37) 
   
 
VC Quality 
Rank 
   
.0119** 
  
.0073 
     
(2.09) 
  
(1.22) 
Macro-Economic Variables 
      
 
VC Investments Index .0103* .0087* .0083* 
 
.0093* .0031* 
   
(1.89) (1.73) (1.91) 
 
(1.89) (1.83) 
 
VC Commitments Index .0087* .0056 .0049 
 
.0043 .0024 
   
(1.68) (1.45) (1.21) 
 
(1.16) (.97) 
 
Nasdaq Index 
 
.0192 .0188 .0183 
 
.0114 .0093 
   
(1.52) (1.43) (.92) 
 
(1.18) (.74) 
 
Constant 
 
-
86.0429* 
-
85.8430* 82.0568** 
 
68.24* 67.94* 
   
(1.89) (1.92) (2.37) 
 
(1.69) (1.74) 
                  
 
Observations 
 
5343 5343 5343 
 
7524 7524 
  Pseudo R-Squared 0.1203 0.1783 0.1897   0.1043 0.1783 
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Based on the average follow-on funding rate of 33.40% for the base sample, seed 
accelerator participation is associated with a 9% increase in the probability of receiving 
follow-on funding, based on the sample of US firms only, using Model 3. With respect to 
regressions of the sample including firms from all countries, based on Model 2 
accelerator participation is associated with an increase of 7% in the probability of follow-
on funding, based on an average follow-on funding rate of 28.80%. This result is 
significant at the 10% level. The results suggest a significant relationship between seed 
accelerator programs and follow-on firm funding. 
I also find that an increase in the age of the firm results in a higher probability of 
follow-on funding, by 3% and 2% for US and firms from all countries, respectively. 
More favorable venture capital quality and location ranks, each also make it more likely 
that a United States firm will receive follow-on funding, by 3% and 5%, respectively. 
 To further examine the relationship between accelerator program participation 
and follow-on funding, I create a sample of matched pairs of firms. Each matched pair 
contains two firms, one that attended an accelerator program and one that did not. The 
firms are first matched based on the date of seed funding, and then based on the amount 
of such seed financing. The matching process involves pairing the firms using the closest 
match on each of the two parameters, in order.22 
Table 14 reports the marginal effects of the multivariate regressions related to the 
matched data set. The primary variable of interest is again the dummy variable indicating 
whether the firm participated in a seed accelerator program. In all of the models the 
coefficient on the primary variable of interest, the coefficient on this variable is positive 
                                                          
22 To facilitate use of the entire sample of firms that attended an accelerator program, firms that did not 
attend such a program are matched multiple times, if necessary. 
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and statistically significant. The results are consistent with my hypothesis that accelerator 
program participation has a positive impact on whether a start-up receives follow-on 
funding, in the three years following initial seed funding. 
As can be seen in Table 14, the results show a significant positive relation 
between follow-on funding and accelerator program participation. Based on the average 
follow-on funding rate of 36.02% among US firms, seed accelerator participation is 
associated with a 14% increase in the probability of receiving follow-on funding, using 
Model 3. With respect to firms from all countries, in which the average follow-on 
funding rate is 31.72%, seed accelerator attendance increases the likelihood of receiving 
follow-on funding by 12%, based on Model 2. The results suggest a significant 
relationship between seed accelerator programs and follow-on funding. 
With respect to changes in the characteristics of the firm, I also find that a one-
year increase in the average age of the founders results in a higher probability of follow-
on funding, by 3% for US firms. An increase of one year in the age of the firm results in a 
6% and 8% increase in the likelihood of follow-on funding for U.S. firms and companies 
from all countries, respectively. An increase in the ranking of the venture capitalist 
results in a higher probability of 4% for U.S. firms, and 3% for firms from all countries. 
A higher location rank associated with U.S. firms results in an increase in the probability 
of receiving follow-on funding by 5%. 
The voluntary nature of the application process for participation in seed 
accelerator programs, coupled with the fact that firms are selected by a seed accelerator 
program after an application process, presents an area for possible criticism of my 
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TABLE 14: Regressions of follow-on funding on accelerator participation with matched 
sample of firms 
This table reports the probit results of regressions of follow-on funding on accelerator 
participation, as well as the control variables with the data sample of all firms. The firms 
are matched first based on the date of seed funding, and second based on the amount of 
seed funding, both by quarter. The firm with the closest match for each of these criteria is 
used. The sample includes 2,682 firms in the U.S. only sample, and 3,434 firms in the 
sample from all countries. In this regression specification, Follow-On Funding is a 
dummy variable, and denotes whether the individual firm received follow-on funding 
during the three years following initial seed funding. All other variables are defined as in 
Table 4.  Year dummies are included in the specification, but not reported. Z-Scores are 
reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
      USA All Countries   
      Model 1 Model 2 Model 3   Model 1 Model 2 
         
 
Accelerator Participation 0.0531*** 0.0511*** 0.0507** 
 
0.0439** .0422** 
   
(3.16) (2.63) (2.49) 
 
(2.41) (2.17) 
Firm Characteristic Variables 
      
 
Average Founders Age 
(Years) .0213** .0188** .0116* 
 
0.0117 .0097 
   
(2.49) (2.42) (1.89) 
 
(1.54) (1.27) 
 
Age of Firm (Years)) .0267*** .0256** .0219** 
 
0.0293** .0263** 
   
(3.62) (2.51) (2.41) 
 
(2.33) (2.51) 
 
Location 
Rank 
  
0.0239*** .0182** 
   
    
(3.16) (2.45) 
   
 
VC Quality 
Rank 
   
.0149*** 
  
.0098** 
     
(3.74) 
  
(2.48) 
Macro-Economic Variables 
      
 
VC Investments Index 0.0173*** 0.0144** .0133** 
 
0.0144* .0108* 
   
(3.09) (2.49) (2.09) 
 
(1.78) (1.83) 
 
VC Commitments Index 0.0259** 0.01254** .0116* 
 
0.0079 .0074* 
   
(2.03) (2.01) (1.83) 
 
(1.55) (1.83) 
 
Nasdaq 
Index 
 
0.0134** 0.0098 .0093 
 
0.0037* .0018 
   
(1.98) (1.63) (1.58) 
 
(1.68) (1.53) 
 
Constant 
 
-188.92** -188.53** -187.16** 
 
-168.34** -154.32* 
   
(-2.22) (-1.49) (-1.57) 
 
(-1.34) (-1.65) 
                  
 
Observations 
 
2682 2682 2682 
 
3434 3434 
  Pseudo R-Squared 0.2493 0.2745 0.3178   0.1793 0.1903 
  
 79 
analysis. It could be argued that it is possible that the characteristics of firms participating 
in these programs are systematically different than firms that do not. For example, firms 
may have founders with different attributes or different types of products. These 
unobserved characteristics could have an effect on the results of a study of the funding of 
firms. To ameliorate this possible concern, I use also use an instrumental variable, two-
stage least squares approach, for robustness. 
The instrument used should satisfy two properties: 1) Z must be correlated with 
accelerator participation, and 2) Z is not correlated with the dependent variable in the 
second-stage regression. I use two such variables. The first is the number of founders. 
The second such variable used is the percentage of firms funded by the venture capitalist 
operating the accelerator program, that have been participants in such program. Both 
variables meet each criteria for inclusion as explanatory variables in the first stage of the 
two-stage regression. 
 I run two stage least square regressions, of accelerator participation on the 
instrumental and other control variables. I then use the predicted results in a second stage 
of the regressions to evaluate the results as compared to those found herein. The results 
do not significantly differ from those here with respect to the primary variable of interest, 
accelerator participation. This further supports the conclusion that accelerator 
participation is positively related to follow-on funding. 
2.4.3 Characteristics of Seed Accelerator Program Participant Follow-on Funding 
In this section, I investigate whether the characteristics of the follow-on funding 
differ between accelerator program participants and non-accelerator program firms. The 
goal is to determine whether program participants exhibit more favorable funding round 
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characteristics. To explore the characteristics of the following-on funding of firms that 
have participated in seed accelerator programs, as compared to firms that have not, I use 
four regression models based on an equation of following the form: 
follow-on funding characteristicsi = f(accelerator participationi, control 
variablesi) 
 
In this system, follow-on funding characteristicsi represents the dependent 
variable specific to each of the models: Total follow-on funding, average amount of 
individual funding rounds, average number of follow-on funding rounds, and time 
between funding rounds. Each of regression equations is based on funding during the 
three years that follow initial seed funding. 
As with the probit regression equation in Section 2.4.1, the primary explanatory 
variable of interest, Accelerator participationi represents a dummy variable based on 
whether the firm participated in a seed accelerator program. The set of control variables, 
similar to that used in the initial regressions above, is used to capture firm-specific 
characteristics, including venture capital quality rank, location rank of the firm, average 
age of the founders, and age of the firm. Again, I use venture capital commitments, 
venture capital investments index, and the NASDAQ composite index to control for 
venture capital industry, and mac-economic factors. The models also control for time 
effects in the system. 
2.4.3.1 Total Amount of Follow-on Funding 
 To explore the characteristics of follow-on funding among firms, I first 
investigate the total funds raised by the firm in the three years following initial seed 
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funding. If participation in such programs benefit the firm, accelerates its growth, and 
reduces agency and information asymmetry concerns, one would expect that the 
following hypothesis would hold: 
H2: Seed accelerator participation increases the total amount of follow-on funding 
raised by the firm during the three years following initial seed financing. 
To test this hypothesis I use the following regression equation: 
Follow-On Fundingi (total $ amount) = α + β1 x Accelerator Participationi (2) 
+ β2 x VC Quality Ranki,t-1 + β4 x Location Ranki,t-1 
+ β5 x Founder Agei,t + β6 x Age of Firmt 
+ β7 x VC Commitments Indexi, t-1 + β8 x VC Investments Indexi,t-1 
+ β9 x NASDAQ Indexi,t-1 + εi 
 
In this regression equation the total amount of follow-on funding raised in the 
three years following initial seed funding is the dependent variable. The primary 
explanatory variable of interest is the dummy variable associated with accelerator 
participation. The control variables are as discussed in Section 2.4.1. I find that the total 
amount of follow-on funding raised has a positive relationship with accelerator program 
participation. 
Table 15 presents the results of the regression based on the matched set of data. I 
find a significant positive relationship between the total amount of follow-on funding 
raised during the three years following seed funding, and accelerator program 
participation. For the data set containing only United State firms, such participation 
increases the total follow on funding by $520,000 during such time period, and the result 
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is significant at the 1% level. The increase in total follow-on funding is $369,000 when 
testing the matched sample of firms from all countries, and is significant at the 5% level. 
These findings support the theory that accelerator participation has a significant impact 
on follow-on funding in the three years following seed funding. 
I also find a positive relationship between both the average age of founders and 
the age of the firm, and total follow-on funding. As could be expected, an increase in the 
venture capital quality rank, and the location rank, both result in an increase in total 
follow-on funding. 
2.4.3.2 Amount of Individual Follow-on Funding Rounds 
 Next, I turn my attention to the individual follow-on funding rounds. I first test 
whether accelerator participation results in a change in the average size of the individual 
funding rounds. A positive relationship between the maturity of the firm and the size of 
funding rounds has been well documented in the literature (Gompers and Lerner (2004)).   
Accelerators are thought to assist companies in their early-stage growth. 
Additionally, a second primary benefit of seed accelerator programs is thought to be early 
mentoring and monitoring on the part of venture capitalists. Based on these two primary 
benefits, one would expect that participation in such a program would result in an 
increased growth rate, and reduced agency and information asymmetry concerns. Both of 
these results would be expected to lead accelerator participants to enjoy an increase in the 
size of individual funding rounds. This logic leads to the following hypothesis: 
H3: Seed accelerator participation increases the amount of individual follow-on 
funding rounds during the three years following initial seed financing. 
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TABLE 15: Regressions of follow-on funding characteristics on accelerator 
participation with matched data 
 
This table reports results from regressions related to the characteristics of follow-on 
funding. The sample includes 1,054 firms in the U.S. only sample, and 1,226 firms in the 
sample from all countries.  Panel A reports the results of regressions of total follow-on 
funding on seed accelerator participation and the control variables. Panel B reports the 
results of regressions of the size of follow-on funding rounds on seed accelerator 
participation and the control variables. The explanatory variables are defined in the same 
manner as in Table 6. Year dummies are included in the specification, but not reported. 
T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
   
Panel A: Total Follow-On Funding 
 
Panel B: Size of Funding Rounds 
        
      Total Follow-On Funding   
Size of Follow-On Funding 
Rounds 
      U.S. All Countries   U.S. All Countries 
        
 
Accelerator Participation 0.5203*** 0.3693** 
 
.2782** .1471** 
   
(3.27) (2.49) 
 
(2.41) (2.57) 
Firm Characteristic Variables 
     
 
Average Founders Age 
(Years) 0.0643* 0.0943* 
 
.0732 .0821 
   
(1.73) (1.87) 
 
(1.59) (1.07) 
 
Age of Firm (Years) 0.0343*** 0.0742** 
 
.0631* .1193 
   
(2.71) (2.03) 
 
(1.92) (1.53) 
 
VC Quality 
Rank 
 
0.0875** 0.1683* 
 
.1293** .2010* 
   
(2.39) (1.72) 
 
(2.03) (1.93) 
 
Location Rank 
 
0.0708** 
  
.0932* 
 
   
(2.16) 
  
(1.79) 
 Macro-Economic Variables 
     
 
VC Investments Index 0.1463*** 0.0732** 
 
.1253* .0831* 
   
(4.29) (2.56) 
 
(1.71) (1.67) 
 
VC Commitments Index 0.1183** 0.0104 
 
.0632* .0329 
   
(2.41) (1.59) 
 
(1.83) (.92) 
 
Nasdaq Index 
 
0.0343* 0.0253 
 
.0491 .0382 
   
(1.73) (1.19) 
 
(1.32) (1.19) 
                
        
 
Observations 
 
1054 1226 
 
1054 1226 
  Adjusted R-Squared 0.2754 0.2194   0.2103 0.1728 
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This hypothesis is tested using the following regression equation. 
Average size of follow-on funding roundsi = α + β1 x Accelerator Participationi (3) 
+ β2 x Total $ Amount Raisedi + β3  VC Quality Ranki,t-1 
+ β4 x Location Ranki,t-1 + β5 x Founder Agei,t + β6 x Age of Firmt 
+ β7 x VC Commitments Indexi, t-1 + β8 x VC Investments Indexi,t-1 
+ β9 x NASDAQ Indexi,t-1 + εi 
 
The dependent variable in this second regression equation related to the 
characteristics of follow-on funding, is the average size of follow-on funding rounds. 
Again, the primary explanatory variable of interest is the dummy variable associated with 
accelerator participation. The control variables are as discussed in Section 2.4.1. I find 
that the average size of follow-on funding rounds is positively related to accelerator 
program participation. 
The results, presented in Table 15, demonstrate a positive relationship between 
the average size of individual funding rounds and accelerator participation. Specifically, 
among the United State firms, it results in an increase of approximately $278,000 in the 
average size of individual funding rounds. The increase is $147,000 for firms from all 
countries. Both findings are significant at the 5% level. While a number of the results 
related to other variables in this regression were not significant, I do find that, for firms in 
the United State, there is a significant relation between the age of the firm, venture capital 
quality rank, and the rank of the location of the firm. With respect to firms from all 
counties, only the venture capital rank is statistically significant.  
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2.4.3.3 Number of Follow-on Funding Rounds 
Building on the above ideas, if accelerated firms receive larger amounts of 
funding, in larger individual rounds, these early-stage firms would be expected to raise 
fewer rounds of funding overall. To evaluate this issue, I test whether seed accelerator 
participation impacts the total number of financing rounds during the first three years 
following seed funding, leading to the following hypothesis: 
H4: Seed accelerator participation decreases the number of follow-on funding 
rounds during the three years following initial seed financing. 
 I use the following regression equation to test this hypothesis: 
Number of follow-on funding roundsi = α + β1 x Accelerator Participationi (4) 
+ β2 x Total $ Amount Raisedi + β3 x VC Quality Ranki,t-1 
+ β4 x Location Ranki,t-1 + β5 x Founder Agei,t + β6 x Age of Firmt 
+ β7 x VC Commitments Indexi, t-1 + β8 x VC Investments Indexi,t-1 
+ β9 x NASDAQ Indexi,t-1 + εi 
 
In this regression equation the number of follow-on funding rounds in the three 
years following initial seed funding is the dependent variable. The primary explanatory 
variable of interest is the dummy variable associated with accelerator participation, while 
the control variables are as discussed in Section 2.4.1. I find that the number of follow-on 
funding rounds has a negative relationship with accelerator program participation. 
The results are reported in Table 16. I find a significant negative relationship 
between the number of follow-on funding rounds and accelerator program participation. 
This finding supports the theory that accelerator participation decreases agency and 
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information asymmetry concerns in the relationship between the firm and its financers. 
More particularly, I find that such participation decreases the number of follow-on 
funding rounds by .23 rounds, when testing the sample of United States firms 
exclusively. When running the regression on the sample of firms from all countries, the 
results indicate that accelerator participation decreases the number of follow-on funding 
rounds by .11 rounds. 
2.4.3.4 Time Between Follow-on Funding Rounds 
As a final component of my analysis, I turn to the issue of whether accelerator 
participation affects the time between funding rounds of accelerator participants. If 
agency and information asymmetry concerns are reduced by early venture capital 
involvement through an accelerator program, it would be expected that this would be 
reflected in the duration of funding associated with the firms that participate in these 
programs. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H5: Seed accelerator participation increases the time between follow-on funding 
rounds during the three years following initial seed financing. 
I test this hypothesis with the following regression equation: 
Average Time Between Follow-On Funding Roundsi =    (5) 
a + β1 x Accelerator Participationi 
+ β2 x Total $ Amount Raised + β3 VC Quality Ranki,t-1 
+ β4 x Location Ranki,t-1 + β5 x Founder Agei,t + β6 x Age of Firmt 
+ β7 x VC Commitments Indexi, t-1 + β8 x VC Investments Indexi,t-1 
+ β9 x NASDAQ Indexi,t-1 + εi 
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TABLE 16: Regressions of follow-on funding characteristics on accelerator 
participation with matched data 
 
This table reports results from regressions related to the characteristics of follow-on 
funding. The sample includes 1,054 firms in the U.S. only sample, and 1,226 firms in the 
sample from all countries.  Panel A reports the results of regressions of number of follow-
on funding rounds, in the three years following initial seed funding, on seed accelerator 
participation and the control variables. Panel B reports the results of regressions of the 
time between the follow-on funding rounds, in the three years following initial seed 
funding, on seed accelerator participation and the control variables. The explanatory 
variables are defined in the same manner as in Table 6. Year dummies are included in the 
specification, but not reported. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
   
Panel A: Number of Funding 
Rounds 
 
Panel B: Time Between Funding 
Rounds 
        
      
Number of Follow-On Funding 
Rounds   
Time Between Follow-On Funding 
Rounds 
      U.S. All Countries   U.S. All Countries 
        
 
Accelerator Participation -.2369** -.1143 
 
.0832** .1429* 
   
(-2.27) (-1.61) 
 
(2.53) (1.81) 
Firm Characteristic Variables 
     
 
Average Founders Age 
(Years) -.0246 -.0351* 
 
.0134* .0392 
   
(-1.48) (-1.82) 
 
(1.72) (1.58) 
 
Age of Firm (Years) -.0385 -0503 
 
.0243** .0349** 
   
(-1.05) (-1.14) 
 
(2.09) (2.37) 
 
VC Quality 
Rank 
 
.0057* .0183 
 
-.0392** -.0083** 
   
(1.87) (1.41) 
 
(-2.49) (-2.38) 
 
Location 
Rank 
 
-.0732* -.1102 
 
.0283* .0528** 
   
(-1.67) (-1.49) 
 
(1.82) (2.39) 
Macro-Economic Variables 
     
 
VC Investments Index -.0832** -.0524* 
 
.0592* .0093* 
   
(-2.17) (-1.73) 
 
(1.75) (1.69) 
 
VC Commitments Index -.0345* -.0193 
 
.0392* .0194 
   
(-1.87) (-.93) 
 
(1.71) (1.22) 
 
Nasdaq 
Index 
 
.0082 .0103 
 
.0039 .0014 
   
(.82) (.61) 
 
(1.61) (1.01) 
                
        
 
Observations 
 
1054 1226 
 
1054 1226 
  Adjusted R-Squared 0.1784 0.0932   0.1284 0.0754 
 
  
 88 
The dependent variable in this regression is the average time elapsed (duration) 
between two adjacent rounds of financing for a firm. Like the other regression equations, 
the primary explanatory variable of interest is the dummy variable associated with 
accelerator participation. The other control variables are as discussed in Section 2.4.1. I 
find that the average time between follow-on funding rounds is negatively related to 
accelerator program participation. 
 As can be seen in Table 16, I find that there is a significant positive relationship 
between accelerator participation and the average time between follow-on funding 
rounds. Such program attendance increases the average time between rounds by 
approximately 29 days for United States firms, and 51 days when analyzing firms in all 
countries. This finding further supports the theory that accelerated firms enjoy lower 
agency conflicts and information asymmetry.  
2.4.4 Causes of Follow-on Funding Characteristics 
 In this study, I find a significant positive relationship between accelerator 
program participation and follow-on funding. I also find that accelerators also impact the 
characteristics of a firm’s follow-on funding in a favorable way. These results suggest 
that the funding of firms, after they have participated in an accelerator program, differs as 
compared to firms that do not attend such a program.  There are a number of possible 
rationales for the differences in funding patterns. I present three possible hypotheses for 
future research. 
1. Agency conflict benefits. Participation in an accelerator program reduces 
potential agency conflicts, through intense early-stage monitoring. The 
process of attending the program allows the venture capitalist to observe 
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the founders and assists them in choosing firms to invest in with the 
lowest potential agency conflicts. 
2. Information asymmetry benefits. Acceleration reduces information 
asymmetry. This rationale for more favorable funding of accelerated firms 
suggests that these companies have lower firm-specific information 
asymmetry between the firm and the venture capitalists. 
3. Firm-specific benefits. Accelerator participation provides firms with 
accelerated mentoring, product and firm development, and publicity. 
Through the acceleration process, the founders are able to test ideas 
quickly, receive feedback from experienced investors, spend less time 
“chasing funds,” and put the financing they do receive to work more 
quickly. All of these factors result in a firm that develops faster than their 
non-accelerated counterparts. 
These three hypotheses suggest that either the firm is changed by the process of 
acceleration, or its relationship with investors is altered. In particular, the first two 
hypotheses, are based primarily on improvements in the relationship between the firm 
and its investors, the venture capitalist. The third hypothesis suggests that the primary 
benefits of acceleration inure directly to the firm being accelerated which then results in 
more favorable funding. 
While the results of this study are consistent with the three proposed hypotheses, 
the individual findings shed light on which factors may be at play. All three hypothesis 
suggest a finding that accelerated firms would have a higher likelihood of receiving 
follow-on funding, and that the total amount raised would be larger. However, my 
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findings with respect to the amount of the individual funding rounds, time between such 
rounds, and overall number of rounds suggest that the primary benefit from accelerator 
programs may be in its impact on the relationship between the firm and the investors. 
Since the primary rationale presented in the extant literature for staged funding 
rounds is that this type of financing structure allows the venture capital firm to both 
monitor agency conflicts, and reduce information asymmetry, the results herein suggest 
that acceleration significantly alters these factors in follow-on funding. Accelerated firms 
receive larger amounts of funding per round, have fewer overall rounds, and enjoy longer 
periods of time between such rounds. This suggests that accelerator programs may offer 
venture capitalists the opportunity to reduce potential agency conflicts and information 
asymmetry, and they provide more favorable funding as a result. 
2.5  Conclusion 
Seed accelerator programs represent a relatively recent phenomenon. They, 
however, play an increasingly important vehicle to assist young firms with funding and 
development. Despite their growing importance, there is a lack of literature related to 
their impact on how a firm’s financing evolves. This paper provides the first examination 
of the impact of accelerator participation on follow-on funding success and 
characteristics. 
In this study I find a significant positive relationship between accelerator 
participation and whether a young firm raises follow-on funding in the three years 
following initial seed funding. Overall the evidence suggests that seed accelerator 
programs provide the benefit of an increased likelihood of obtaining follow-on funding. 
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Since this is a primary measure of start-up success, it seems that seed accelerator program 
participation leads to a higher likelihood of success for start-ups. 
In the second component of my analysis, I examine the characteristics of follow-
on funding with a focus on whether the firm participated in a seed accelerator program. I 
find that there is a significant positive relation between accelerator program participation 
and the total amount of follow-on funding raised, the average size of follow-on funding 
rounds, and the average time between such funding rounds. I find a negative relationship 
between accelerator program attendance and the number of follow-on funding rounds. 
Each of the findings with respect to the characteristics of follow-on funding rounds is 
consistent with the theory that accelerator programs reduce agency conflicts as well as 
information asymmetry. 
This research makes a number of significant contributions to the literature. First, 
the study fills a gap in the research related to one of the newest funding vehicle, venture 
capital accelerators. Second, this study adds to the literature in a significant way in that it 
provides a foundation from which to examine the long-term effects of these new funding 
vehicles on both private and public companies. 
 
CHAPTER 3: THE PRECIPITOUS DECLINE OF IPOs: EVIDENCE FROM 
THE MARKET FOR REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Over the past decade there has been a precipitous decline in the number of initial 
public offering (IPO) of equity securities. An average of only 99 firms had initial public 
offerings during the period of 2001-2012, compared to an average of 310 firms that went 
public each year from 1980-2000. Making this significant decline in IPOs even more 
striking is the fact that much of the trend has been concentrated in small firms. 
Comparing IPOs from 1980-2000 to 2001-2009, a decrease of more than 80%, from an 
average of 165 small-firm initial public offerings each year to only 30, is observable in 
the latter period (Gao, Ritter, and Zhu (2013); Jensen, Marshall, and Jahera (2012)). This 
downtrend can also be observed among IPOs related to Real Estate Investment Trusts 
(REIT). While small-firm IPOs made up 57% of the REIT initial public offerings in the 
decade from 1991 through 2000, these offerings made up only 21% of the offerings in the 
period from 2001 through 2010. The importance of this paradigm shift in how firms grow 
and raise capital cannot be overstated. 
The recent trend in offerings represents a major shift in how small firms raise 
capital. The public equity markets represent a cornerstone of the U.S. financial system, 
and one that impacts the economy as a whole. In addition, whether government 
regulation is having a detrimental impact on small real estate-related firms is of 
importance to founders, investors and regulators. Real Estate Investment Trusts, which
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were first created by Congress in 1960, have long served the dual purposes of providing 
access to capital for urban expansion and renewal, as well as allowing for investment in 
real estate without the double taxation that often plagues many corporations. As real 
estate investment trusts have grown to play a major role in real estate ownership, 
development, and management, they have become a central foundation of the U.S. real 
estate industry. 
A number of explanations for the precipitous decline in initial public offerings 
have been suggested in the finance literature. First, some have suggested that the trend in 
the number of initial public offerings is due to dynamics in the regulatory environment 
(Weild and Kim (2008, 2009); Zweig (2010); Weild (2011)) and the IPO Task Force 
(2011)). Known as the Regulatory Overreach Theory, this explanation posits that 
government regulations, such as the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act, and Regulation FD have made it more costly for small public companies to operate, 
and therefore, fewer small businesses are going public. Those who have taken this 
position have cited both changes in the regulatory environment, as well as dynamics in 
how small companies are analyzed and covered within the securities industry, as a result 
of such regulatory changes, as the primary causes of the decline in small-firm initial 
public offerings. 
Others, such as Gao, Ritter, and Zhu (2013), have presented a different theory to 
explain the decline in small-firm IPOs. They argue that there has been a fundamental 
change in the economy over the past decade resulting in a decrease in the profitability of 
small companies. The proponents of this Economies of Scope Theory contend that small 
companies increasingly have a difficult time earning profits in an economy that 
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increasingly rewards larger businesses.  Therefore, as the theory states, rather than going 
public companies are choosing to merge with other firms, and take other steps to compete 
in their markets. The changes, they suggest, go beyond regulatory changes, and have 
been gradually impacting how firms grow for two decades. 
This second theory suggests that small firms must grow quickly to compete, and 
due to technological changes are required to respond in a short period of time or lose 
profitable opportunities. In many instances, they can create higher profits by selling out 
to large firms who enjoy economies of scope and scale. Some have argued that this 
theory also suggests that small independent companies have evolved, and must be less 
focused on immediate profit-maximization, then their historical counterparts, even 
though they operate in what has been characterized as an “eat or be eaten” environment 
(Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001)). 
The goal of this study is to examine the recent IPO trends in the market for real 
estate investment trusts, in an effort to determine if there is support for the primary 
theories related to the decline in initial public offerings. To my knowledge, no other study 
has examined the changes in the market for small-firm REIT initial public offerings. Real 
Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) provide a unique opportunity to study this issue. With 
respect to REITs, the overall number of initial offerings has not declined as dramatically 
as in the general market for securities. In fact, REITs have enjoyed increased popularity 
as an entity-structure for both private and public real estate firms over the past decade. 
However, despite the growing popularity of REITs in general, the decline in small-firm 
REIT initial public offerings23 have seen a significant 77% decline, when comparing the 
decade from 1991 through 2000, to that of 2001 through 2010. In fact, small-company 
                                                          
23 Small-Firm IPOs are defined as offerings of less than $150,000 million at the time of the offering, 
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REIT IPOs have become nearly extinct in today’s securities markets. Since the end of 
2004, there have been only 5 RIET offerings of less than $150 million. The same 
disappearance of small-firm REIT IPOs is observable when examining the dollar volume 
of initial public offerings. 
In addition to the significant decline in small-firm IPOs, Real Estate Investment 
Trusts offer other benefits in terms of studying the decline in initial public offerings. 
These real estate companies are typically capital intensive, hold a large percentage of 
fixed assets, and because of the rules associated with how REITs distribute earnings, are 
uniquely transparent with respect to their performance and financial information. Finally, 
the real estate industry is largely isolated from the traditional venture capital market, 
which has been cited as a possible cause of the recent IPO trends. These characteristics 
provide fruitful ground to study the different theories that could explain the recent IPO 
phenomenon. 
In this paper, I test the leading explanations for the decline in IPOs, from the 
perspective of real estate investment trusts, and present numerous results related to the 
validity of such theories, in this context. My regression equation specification tests both 
the gradual change in the economic climate for firms, as well as the impact of a number 
of key legislative changes that are thought to be the primary regulatory changes 
impacting IPOs, including the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the 
Global Settlement, and Regulation NMS. 
I present findings that provide support for the Economies of Scope Theory, and are 
inconsistent with the Regulatory Overreach Theory, with respect to small-firm REIT 
initial public offerings. Specifically, I find that there is no relation between the number of 
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quarterly small-firm REIT IPOs, as well as the dollar volume of such IPOs, and the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the Global Settlement, and Regulation NMS, after controlling for 
changes in the economic climate for small firms. In addition, my results support the 
Economies of Scope Theory, and suggest that, except with respect to the Gramm-Leach-
Blilley Act, the decline in the number of small-firm REIT IPOs has been a gradual trend 
rather than one punctuated by discrete shocks. With respect to large-firm REIT IPOs I 
find that there does not appear to be a relationship between the number of large-firm 
REIT offerings, and the legislation thought to have impacted initial public offerings. The 
results provide limited support for the Regulatory Overreach Theory, with respect to the 
impact of regulations on the volume of large-firm real estate investment trust initial 
public offerings. 
This paper offers a unique perspective on the declining initial public offering 
phenomenon. It provides an analysis of the different theories related to the decline in 
IPOs, and insights into the impact of government regulations, from the perspective of the 
market for real estate-related firms. The data and methodology examines specific, 
literature-based theories with respect to the decline in IPOs, and provides support for the 
Economies of Scale/Scope Theory, with respect to real estate investment trusts. To my 
knowledge, no other literature has examined the recent changes in initial public offerings 
in this context. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 3.2, I present an overview of the 
literature related to the decline in initial public offerings and the theories that have been 
presented to explain the downtrend. Section 3.3 presents the Data and Sample Selection. 
Section 3.4 provides the Empirical Analysis. Section 3.5 concludes. 
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3.2 Literature Review 
Initial public offerings in the United States have been on the decline over the past 
decade. It is well documented that, during the period of 1980-2000, an average of 310 
firms went public each year. Over the past decade, however, the number of IPOs each 
year has decreased substantially. From 2001-2012, an average of only 99 firms engaged 
in initial public offerings (Gao, Ritter, and Zhu (2013); Jensen, Marshall, and Jahera 
(2012)). Figure 1 presents the number of initial public offerings, by year, for small and 
large firms in the U.S. 
While this recent trend is surprising, the specific characteristics of the firms that 
have experienced the largest decline help shed light on the phenomenon. A large 
proportion of the decline in IPOs, has been concentrated in small firms. Figure 1 provides 
the yearly number of initial public offerings, based on small and large categories of firms. 
The number of yearly small-company IPOs has dropped by more than 80%, from an 
average of 165 IPOs each year during the period of 1980-2000, to just 30 per year from 
2001-2009. (Gao, Ritter, and Zhu (2013) and Jensen, Marshall, and Jahera (2012)). 
The same trend is observable when examining REIT offerings. Over the past 
decade, small IPOs have nearly disappeared from the REIT equity market. Just twenty 
years ago the majority of IPOs by real estate investment trusts were issued by small 
companies, those offering less than $150 million. Today, however, such offerings have 
become nearly nonexistent. Specifically, from 1991 through 2000 small company REIT 
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IPOs made up 57% of all real estate-related IPOs, on average. For the period from 2001 
through 2010, however, small company IPOs only accounted for only 21% of all REIT 
IPOs. With respect to the dollar volume of REIT IPOs one can observe the same 
downtrend, with a decrease for small-firm IPOs from 33% to just 6% of all IPOs when 
comparing the same two periods of time. 
A number of theories have been presented in the finance literature to explain the 
dramatic decline in small-company IPOs. The preponderance of the research to date has 
focused on the possible impact of changes in the regulatory environment on initial public 
offerings. This premise, termed the Regulatory Overreach Theory, suggests that changes 
in government regulations have caused the overall reduction in the number of small-firm 
IPOs, due to increased costs associated with operating a public company. 
The costs are the result of a litany of accounting and compliance laws and rules 
imposed by new legislation. Beginning in 1999 the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, which 
repealed the Glass Steagall Act, changed the equity markets by removing restrictions on 
affiliations between Commercial banks and securities firms. Other legislation that 
changed the equity landscape over the past decade were the Global Settlement and 
Regulation NMS. Some authors have also argued that due to regulatory changes, analyst 
coverage of initial public offerings has changed in recent years. These changes, they 
suggest, have had a large impact on small company offerings. (Weild and Kim (2010)). 
Figure 1 also presents the key legislation thought to have impacted initial public 
offerings, along with the number of IPOs by year. The primary legislation thought to 
have influenced initial public offerings are: 
A. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
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effectively repealed the Glass-Steagall Act, allowing commercial banks to engage in 
investment banking activities. Further, the legislation requires that companies that offer 
consumer financial products or services such as loans, financial or investment advice, and 
insurance explain their information sharing practices to their customers and safeguard 
sensitive data. Financial institutions must protect the consumer information they collect 
under the Safeguards rule. The act also implemented an interagency notice research 
project that developed privacy notices that consumers can understand. Financial 
institution must tell their customers about their information sharing practices and the 
consumers right to "opt-out.” 
B. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was enacted largely 
in response to corporate accounting scandals in the early 2000s, such as Enron, Tyco, and 
WorldCom. The regulation provided for new and severely enhanced standards for all 
U.S. public companies, as well as their managements, boards, and accounting firms. 
Among other requirements, SOX the management of public companies must certify the 
accuracy of financial information, as well as the company processes in place to guarantee 
its accuracy. The act also increased auditing and board of director oversight requirements, 
and imposed criminal penalties for its violation. Compliance with the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act is mandatory for public companies. 
C. The Global Settlement of 2003. The Global Settlement is a $1.4 billion 
settlement agreement reached between the SEC, NASD, NYSE and 10 Wall Street firms 
during an investigation into Wall Street conflicts. The 10 firms agreed to make major 
structural changes to separate their research departments from their investment banking 
departments. The departments must be physically separated, investment banking 
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revenues must have no impact on research budgets, compensation paid to research 
analysts cannot be tied to investment revenues and research analysts must not solicit 
investment banking business. In addition, contracts with independent research firms must 
be in place for customer's that wish to use them. 
 D. Regulation NMS of 2005. The National Market System is a set of rules 
developed by the SEC to improve the U.S. exchanges by improving fairness in price 
execution and the display of quotes and amount and access to market data. The rules 
ensure investors get the best price when their order is executed. It also includes the Sub-
Penny Rule which sets the lowers quotation increment of all stocks over $1.00 per share 
to at least $0.01. Finally, it includes Market Data Rules to allocate revenue to self-
regulator organizations that promote and improve market data access. 
While all of the above regulations have been suggested as possible causes of the 
decline in initial public offering, the primary legislation often cited by proponents of the 
Regulatory Overreach Theory, is the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Weild and Kim (2008, 
2009); Zweig (2010); Weild (2011); IPO Task Force (2011)). Many have debated the 
costs and benefits associated with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). Some have argued that 
the wide-sweeping law has restored confidence in our public companies, and the in which 
their stocks trade. Others, however, have cited the legislation as reducing the United 
States’ competitive edge in the global economy, and causing a decrease in both the 
number of public firms, and the initial public offering of equities. Due to the extensive 
compliance and auditing measures that SOX implemented, the legislation’s opponents 
have argued that small companies cannot afford to operate as public firms in the current 
regulatory environment. In particular, Section 404 of SOX imposed large costs of 
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compliance with respect to reporting and auditing, on small public companies. At some 
point, it has been argued, these costs outweigh the benefits of becoming a public 
company, and the result is fewer small company initial public offerings. Figure 1 
provides a view of the primary legislation thought to have had an impact on initial public 
offerings, together with the number of IPOs, by year. 
In recent years, a number of pieces of legislation have been enacted reducing the 
burdens of the regulation on small public companies. In 2007, for example, the Securities 
Exchange Commission delayed some of the primary small-company compliance 
requirements associated with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, ostensibly reducing the burdens on 
small firms. Going one step further, small businesses were permanently exempted from 
these requirements in September 2010. Despite these changes, however, small-company 
initial public offerings have not increased. In fact, small offerings for real estate firms 
have virtually disappeared, in spite of the regulatory changes relaxing the burdens on 
small firms. It is certainly plausible that government regulation, and the large burdens it 
imposes on small public firms, dampened the market for public offerings. The lack of 
small-firm REIT IPOs since the relaxation of regulatory compliance beginning in 2007, 
however, leads one to question whether the regulatory overreach theory is a primary 
cause of the downtrend associated with REIT IPOs. 
In this regard, Gao, Ritter, and Zhu (2013) present the argument that regulatory 
overreach has not been the primary issue plaguing small-firm offerings. Rather, these 
authors suggest that fundamental changes in the economy over the past decade are the 
main cause of the alarming rate of decline in small company IPOs. These changes, they 
hypothesize, have resulted in a decrease in the profitability of small companies. This 
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decrease in profits, according to the authors, has led small firms to choose other means of 
growth, such a mergers. Figure 2 provides the percentage of initial public offerings 
compared to mergers & acquisitions from 1990 through 2011. 
The Economies of Scope Theory suggests that changes in the economy, such as 
improvements in company efficiency and technology, make it difficult for small firms to 
compete in the marketplace. The circumstances related to this, more recent theory, are 
suggested to be a result of large-firm economies of scale and economies of scope. Small 
firms, it has been argued, must grow quickly, as well as bring new products to market in 
an expeditious manner, to survive. These changes, in turn, have led to fewer small-firm 
initial public offerings, and an increase in mergers as a primary method of raising funds 
and growing businesses. 
Rather than taking the firms public, the theory holds, small companies either sell 
out to larger firms to survive, or are able to create higher profits through nonorganic 
growth, such as a merger. The theory suggests that these changes have resulted in a 
decrease in the profitability of small companies. Some have also suggested that small, 
independent companies have evolved, and today are less focused on short-term profit-
maximization, then their historical counterparts. (Gao, Ritter, and Zhu (2013); Jensen, 
Marshall, and Jahera (2012)). 
 A number of authors have examined economies of scale and scope generally, in 
the context of real estate businesses. In fact, industry-wide consolidation has been 
predicted among real estate firms for nearly two decades. Linneman (1997, 2002) first 
argued that the real estate industry was following a path like most industrialized 
industries. This trend, the papers suggest, is one of consolidation where large, publically-
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traded companies take the lead, and small firms are forced to grow very quickly or merge 
with other businesses simply to survive. 
 Other literature has also found evidence of economies of scale within real estate 
investment trusts in particular. Anderson, Fok, Springer, and Webb (2002) examined 
whether economies of scale exist for real estate-related firms, using a sample of REITs 
from 1992 through 1996. They found that REITs are inefficient in terms of their input 
utilization and failure to operate at constant returns to scale. They also concluded that 
most REITs are operating at increasing returns to scale, which lends support to the 
premise that they can benefit from increased size. Bers and Springer (1997) also conclude 
that economies of scale plays a role among REIT firms. The authors further find that the 
economies of scale for REITs vary considerably over time. 
Reflecting the importance of the recent changes in the market for initial public 
offering a number of groups have proposed changes that are designed to spur growth in 
small businesses and IPOs. The IPO Task Force, which grew from an Access to Capital 
Conference at the U.S. Treasury Department in 2011, published their findings and 
recommendations in October 2011. Their report, Rebuilding the IPO On-Ramp: Putting 
Emerging Growth Companies and the Job Market Back on the Road to Growth, makes a 
number of suggestions. 
First, the task force recommended that there be reductions in the costs for small 
companies going public in the form of easing of legal regulations for firms with revenues 
of less than $1 billion. Second, the report calls for improved availability and flow of 
information for investors to increase the visibility for emerging-growth companies. The 
third suggestion made was to reduce the capital gains tax rate for investors that purchase 
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shares in an IPO and retain the shares for at least two years. Finally, it was recommended 
that there be an increase in education among issuing firms related to initial public 
offerings and their underwriting (IPO task Force (2011)). Without clear evidence as to the 
true causes of the decline in IPOs, and careful consideration as to the best approach to 
address them, however, such measures are unlikely to have a substantial impact on the 
IPO trend. 
The literature with respect to this dynamic topic is still developing. Relevant 
historical observations of the IPO phenomenon have only recently grown to cover a full 
decade. Further, no studies have examined the changes occurring within the market for 
small real estate-related equities. Regardless of the cause of the paradigm shift in new-
firm offerings, the changes represent forces that stand to have ripple effects through every 
aspect of the financial and real estate industries. Taking a firm public has been viewed as 
a primary means of raising capital, and providing for early investor exit, for many years. 
Additionally, the ability of real estate-related companies to raise public funds, and 
provide investors with an opportunity to invest in these companies, have been central 
goals of the REIT structure, since its advent by Congress in 1960. 
If the trend has shifted away from IPOs as a primary method for small firms to 
raise capital, it represents a significant change in the traditional patterns of business 
growth. The impact of the recent changes in the development and financial structure of 
firms is also important to the overall economy. The small business and real estate markets 
enjoys a mutual dependence with the financial markets. Black and Gilson (1999) research 
the importance of an active stock market in the venture capital process. The authors argue 
that the small business industry in the United States flourishes in large part because of the 
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availability of the active stock market. They suggest that the United States stock market 
provides two benefits. First, it offers a readily available early investor exit in the form of 
initial public offerings. Second, they argue that, assuming the company is successful, the 
IPO possibility gives entrepreneurs a valuable option to reacquire control of their 
company from investors. If there have been fundamental changes in how founders view 
their capital and exit options, it stands to have an effect on numerous aspects of the 
financial markets and the economy as a whole. 
While there have been a number of studies that explore the causes of the decline 
in the number of IPOs, and more particularly the changes related to small company 
offerings, the issue is far from resolved. Further, there is a surprising lack of literature 
related to how the apparent trend in initial equity offerings has affected offerings within 
specific industries. In particular, to my knowledge, no research has studied the primary 
theories related to the decline in initial public offerings within the real estate industry. 
3.3 Data and Sample Selection 
 From the National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts (NAREIT), I 
collect all of the real estate investment trust initial public offerings in the Industry Capital 
Offerings database during the period from 1991 through 2010, which yields a sample of 
231 REIT initial public offerings. The data includes amount of offering, date of offering, 
number of shares, opening price, as well as firm-specific information. Related to the 
REIT IPOs, I also collect first day closing price, from SNL Financial. The IPOs are split 
into groups based on the quarter in which the offers took place. Then they are placed into 
two primary categories related to whether the offering was a small IPO or large IPO. 
Small-firm initial public offerings are defined as those that were less than $150 million, 
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at the time of offering. Large-firm offerings are defined as those that were $150 million 
or more. Consistent with the literature, approximately half of the sample is represented in 
each group over the period of 1991 through 2010. The quarterly average IPO initial 
returns are collected from Jay Ritter’s website.24 Real GDP Growth is computed using 
data from the St. Louis Federal Reserve.25 Data related to the Consumer Price Index is 
collected from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.26 I also collect the quarterly NAREIT 
Index data from the National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts. 
Table 17 provides an overview of the frequency of REIT initial public offerings, 
by year, during the sample period. Panel A reflects the number of small and large-firm 
initial public offerings, by year. In addition to the number of offerings, the relative 
percentage of the total number of initial public offerings by each group is also presented. 
Panel B reports yearly averages, for the entire sample, as well as each ten-year period. 
Table 18 presents statistics related to the proceeds of REIT initial public offerings 
between 1991 and 2010. The dollar proceeds for small-firm, as well as those of large 
firms, IPOs are reported, together with averages. 
In addition to the information related to REIT initial public offerings, I collect 
information regarding monthly REIT performance from REIT Watch, published by the 
National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts, for the period of 2000 through 
2010 including firm capitalization, average Funds from Operations (FFO) per share, 
average Price/FFO ratio, firm returns. Finally, from SNL Financial I collect firm-specific 
Net Asset Value (NAV) information for seasoned REIT companies, during the period of  
 
                                                          
24 Jay R. Ritter’s website is: http://bear/warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ 
25 The St. Louis Federal Reserve website is: http://research.stlouisfed.org/ 
26 The Bureau of Labor Statistics website is: http://bls.gov 
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TABLE 17: U.S. real estate investment trust initial public offerings by year 
This table reports the number U.S. Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) initial public 
offerings. Panel A reports the information by year, while Panel B reports annual 
averages. In addition, the table presents the number of small-firm REIT initial public 
offerings, and number of large-firm REIT initial public offerings for each year, as well as 
their respective percentage of the total number of REIT initial public offerings. Small-
firm offerings are defined as initial public offerings of less than $150 million, while 
large-firm offerings are those $150 million or larger. The data is collected from the 
National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts. 
 
Panel A: Number of IPOs by Year 
   
 
       Total Number Small-Firm IPOs Large-Firm IPOs 
Year of IPOs Number 
% of Total Number of 
IPOs Number 
% of Total Number of 
IPOs 
      1991 3 3 100% 0 0% 
1992 6 4 67% 2 33% 
1993 45 19 42% 26 58% 
1994 43 23 53% 20 47% 
1995 8 6 75% 2 25% 
1996 6 4 67% 2 33% 
1997 26 12 46% 14 54% 
1998 17 12 71% 5 29% 
1999 2 1 50% 1 50% 
2000 0 0 0% 0 0% 
2001 0 0 0% 0 0% 
2002 3 2 67% 1 33% 
2003 8 3 38% 5 63% 
2004 28 9 32% 19 68% 
2005 11 2 18% 9 82% 
2006 5 1 20% 4 80% 
2007 4 0 0% 4 100% 
2008 2 0 0% 2 100% 
2009 5 1 20% 4 80% 
2010 9 1 11% 8 89% 
      Total 231 103   128   
      Panel B: Annual Averages 
    
      1991 - 2000 15.60 8.40 63.42% 7.20 36.58% 
2001 - 2010 7.50 1.90 22.84% 5.60 77.16% 
      1991 - 2010 11.55 5.15 43.13% 6.40 56.87%
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TABLE 18: U.S. real estate investment trust initial public offerings dollar 
volume by year 
 
This table reports the dollar volume of U.S. Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) initial 
public offerings. Panel A reports the information by year, while Panel B reports annual 
averages. In addition, the table presents the dollar volume of small-firm REIT initial 
public offerings, and dollar volume of large-firm REIT initial public offerings for each 
year, as well as their respective percentage of the total dollar volume of REIT initial 
public offerings. Small-firm offerings are defined as initial public offerings of less than 
$150 million, while large-firm offerings are those $150 million or larger. The data is 
collected from the National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts. 
 
Panel A: Volume of IPOs by Year 
                
 Total IPO Small Firm IPO % of Total Large Firm IPO % of Total 
Year Proceeds (Millions) Proceeds (Millions) IPO Volume 
Proceeds 
(Millions) 
IPO 
Volume 
      1991 $207.90 $207.90 100.00% $0.00 0.00% 
1992 $842.90 $398.10 47.23% $444.80 52.77% 
1993 $8,530.45 $1,660.06 19.46% $6,870.39 80.54% 
1994 $6,714.13 $1,761.73 26.24% $4,952.40 73.76% 
1995 $922.15 $441.85 47.92% $480.30 52.08% 
1996 $1,107.84 $242.53 21.89% $865.31 78.11% 
1997 $6,296.48 $909.04 14.44% $5,387.44 85.56% 
1998 $2,129.30 $941.20 44.20% $1,188.10 55.80% 
1999 $292.00 $12.00 4.11% $280.00 95.89% 
2000 $0.00 $0.00 0.00% $0.00 0.00% 
2001 $0.00 $0.00 0.00% $0.00 0.00% 
2002 $608.20 $158.20 26.01% $450.00 73.99% 
2003 $2,645.86 $328.11 12.40% $2,317.75 87.60% 
2004 $7,980.44 $482.48 6.05% $7,497.96 93.95% 
2005 $3,789.24 $259.49 6.85% $3,529.75 93.15% 
2006 $2,271.43 $69.00 3.04% $2,202.43 96.96% 
2007 $1,857.88 $0.00 0.00% $1,857.88 100.00% 
2008 $491.00 $0.00 0.00% $491.00 100.00% 
2009 $2,614.49 $115.12 4.40% $2,499.37 95.60% 
2010 $1,986.70 $30.36 1.53% $1,956.34 98.47% 
  
 
   Total $51,288.39 $8,017.17   $43,271.22   
      Panel B: Annual Averages     
      1991 - 2000 $2,704.32 $657.44 24.31% $2,046.87 75.69%
2001 - 2010 $2,424.52 $144.28 5.95% $2,280.25 94.05% 
      1991 - 2010 $2,564.42 $400.86 15.63% $2,163.56 84.37%
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2000 through 2010. The NASDAQ Composite Index is used as a further macroeconomic-
level control variable. 
I collect information related to REIT mergers from SDC Platinum, including firm 
names, dates, type, offering amount, related to REIT mergers during the period from 
1991 through 2010. Limited Partnerships, and firms for which offering characteristics are 
not available, are excluded from the sample. The resulting sample includes 230 real estate 
investment trust initial public offerings. Table 19 reports descriptive statistics related to 
the profitability of REITS. Finally, Table 20 reports statistics related to mergers during 
the sample period. 
3.4 Empirical Analysis 
3.4.1 The Decline in REIT Initial Public Offerings 
Over the past decade, small IPOs have nearly disappeared from the REIT equity 
market. Table 17 reports the statistics related to real estate investment trust offerings. 
From 1991 through 2000 small company REIT IPOs made up 63% of all real estate-
related IPOs, on average. For the period from 2001 through 2010, however, small 
company offerings only accounted for only 23% of all REIT IPOs. The same trend can be 
observed with respect to the dollar volume of REIT initial public offerings. Table 18 
reports the dollar volume of initial public offerings during the sample period. During the 
period from 1991 through 2000, small-firm REIT offerings made up 24% of the total 
IPOs, based on offering proceeds. That figure drops dramatically to just 6% during the 
period of 2001 through 2010. 
One possible explanation for where IPOs have gone over the past decades, states 
that there has been shift toward mergers as a primary method of growing small firms. 
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Figure 2 presents the number of mergers & acquisitions related to firms from all 
industries, along with initial public offerings over the past twenty years, by year. As can 
be seen, there has been a shift away from initial public offerings, and toward mergers & 
acquisitions as a means of growing and exiting firms. Table 19 presents descriptive 
statistics related to the 336 mergers in the sample. As is the case with the initial public 
offerings, there has been a significant change in the overall volume of mergers over the 
past two decades. For example, the volume of U.S. REIT mergers has increased from an 
annual average of $7 billion from 1991 through 2000, to an annual average of $40 billion 
in the period of 2001 through 2010. It is important to note that 2004 had an unusually 
large amount of REIT IPO volume. If you remove 2004 from the sample, however, the 
yearly average volume of mergers is $21 billion for the period of 2000-2010, which still 
represents a significant increase over the prior decade. The same trend holds true for the 
average size of the mergers, which grew from $333 million for the period of 1991-2000, 
compared to $3 billion during the period of 2001-2010. 
Despite the clear evidence that initial public offerings are on the decline as a tool 
for growth and investor exit, the reasons for such decline are unclear. The characteristics 
of the downtrend may provide some explanations. As discussed above, small-firm REIT 
IPOs have experienced a significantly larger decline in initial public offerings. It has been 
suggested that the differential in the IPO trend may be a result of deteriorating 
profitability among small firms. Large firms, the theory suggests, enjoy financial benefits 
due to their relative size. Small businesses, on the other hand do not benefit from these  
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TABLE 19: U.S. real estate investment trust mergers by year 
This table reports the frequency, total dollar volume, and average size in millions of 
dollars, of U.S. Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) mergers during the sample period. 
Panel A reports the information by year, while Panel B reports annual averages. The data 
is collected from the National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts. 
 
Panel A: Mergers by Year 
          
 No. of Total Average  
Year Mergers Volume (Millions) Size (Millions) 
    1991 2 $167.80 $83.90
1992 2 $14.60 $7.30 
1993 7 $1,334.73 $190.68 
1994 9 $1,574.48 $174.94 
1995 12 $939.78 $78.32 
1996 23 $7,274.23 $316.27 
1997 35 $12,946.14 $369.89 
1998 32 $23,445.52 $732.67 
1999 21 $11,767.54 $560.36 
2000 17 $13,914.04 $818.47 
2001 17 $16,691.39 $981.85 
2002 26 $14,394.21 $553.62 
2003 22 $10,703.77 $486.54 
2004 10 $198,059.63 $19,805.96 
2005 18 $13,101.70 $727.87 
2006 29 $39,125.64 $1,349.16 
2007 33 $97,870.59 $2,965.78 
2008 7 $2,451.20 $350.17 
2009 9 $502.68 $55.85 
2010 5 $5,251.71 $1,050.34 
    Total 336 $471,531.38 $31,659.94
    Panel B: Annual Averages 
  
    1991 - 2000 16 $7,337.89 $333.28
2001 - 2010 17.6 $39,815.25 $2,832.71 
    1991 - 2010 16.8 $23,576.57 $1,583.00
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types of economies of scope. This differential, it is suggested, puts small businesses at a 
financial disadvantage and they, therefore, are being forced to choose other means of 
growth than initial public offerings. Table 20 provides summary statistics related to real 
estate investment trust profitability during the period from 2000 through 201027. The 
statistics are presented for both small and large U.S. REITs. Small firms are defined as 
those that have total capitalization of less than $250 million, while large REITs have 
capitalization of $250 million or more.28 For each category of firm size, three primary 
metrics are used to access firm profitability in the sample: Average Funds From 
Operations (FFO) per share, Average Price/FFO ratio, and the percentage of firms with 
negative returns. FFO per share is used by real estate investment trusts, as an alternative 
to earnings per share, to define cash flow from their operations. Funds from Operations is 
defined as earnings, plus depreciation and amortization expenses. Because REITs are, by 
virtue of their Internal Revenue Code status, required to hold at least 75% of their assets 
in real estate-related assets, which often appreciate over time, FFO is considered a better 
measure than earnings per share, which can often impacted by depreciation and other 
accounting activities. FFO also adjusts for gains and losses from the sale of property 
since they are not recurring. 
By examining firm profitability for small REITs compared to large REIT firms, 
striking differences are apparent. First, average FFO per share over the sample period is 
1.08 for small firms, compared to 2.49 for the firms categorized as large REITs. This is a 
striking difference, and supports the premise that the market recognizes key differences  
                                                          
27 Reliable data related to real estate investment trust profitability is not available prior to 2000. 
28 A differentiation point of $250 million is used for seasoned REIT firms since they typically have larger 
total capitalization than companies engaging in initial public offerings, and REITs are generally capital 
intensive. 
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TABLE 20: U.S. real estate investment trust summary statistics related to 
profitability of firms over time 
 
This table reports summary statistics related to the profitability of U.S. Real Estate 
Investment Trusts over time. The data is collected from SNL Financial and the National 
Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts. This data is not available prior to 2000, and 
therefore, the sample includes 1,913 publically traded Real Estate Investment Trusts 
traded between 2000 and 2010. The sample is partitioned by capitalization of the firm, 
with those with less than $250 million in capitalization placed in the small-firm category, 
and companies with $250 million or more of capitalization placed in the large-firm 
category. Panel A reports the information by year, while Panel B reports annual averages. 
Funds from Operation is defined as earnings, plus depreciation and amortization 
expenses. 
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in the profitability of small firms as compared to their larger counterparts. Moreover, 
when comparing the first six years of the sample period to the last five years, the statistics 
indicate that the average FFO, per share has declined more than 41%. For large firms, 
however, the decline has been only 4.7%. The average Price/FFO ratio also provides 
insight into the fact that small REITs differ from larger companies in important ways. 
The average Price/FFO ratios for small and large companies are 10.08 and 12.13, 
respectively. 
This difference in Price/FFO ratio for small versus large companies is consistent 
with the Economies of Scope Theory. As a third measure of the market’s perception of 
firm value, Table 4 also reports the percentage of public REIT firms that have negative 
returns, by year. As can be seen, here too there are stark difference when comparing 
small to large REITs. Specifically, on average, 42% of the small-firm REITs have 
negative returns each year, while only 29% of the large firms experienced negative 
returns, during the sample period. 
3.4.2 Explaining the Decline in IPOs: Regulatory Overreach and Economies of Scope 
According to the literature, two primary theories exist related to the decline in the 
volume of initial public offerings over the past decade, particularly with respect to small 
firms. The Regulatory Overreach Theory suggests that the government has decreased the 
ability of small firms to afford to be public companies, and this has resulted in few initial 
public offerings. The Economies of Scope Theory, on the other hand, holds that gradual 
changes in the economy, and how firms operate, have resulted in the precipitous decline 
in IPOs. 
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The goal of this paper is to examine these two theories, from the context of the 
market for real estate investment trusts, which offers a unique opportunity to explore the 
possible causes of the downturn in IPOs. When compared to public firms in general, 
these real estate companies are typically capital intensive and hold a large percentage of 
fixed assets. The Internal Revenue Service rules associated with REIT qualification, that 
require that 75% of these entities’ total assets be held in real estate. In addition, 90% of a 
REIT’s income must be distributed each year. This distribution requirement results in 
these companies being relatively transparent with respect to their performance and 
financial information, when compared to non-real estate-related public companies. These 
characteristics make REITs an excellent candidate to study the different theories that 
could explain the recent IPO phenomenon. 
Another important aspect of the market for REIT IPOs in this study is its relative 
independence from the venture capital industry. It has been argued that the decline in 
IPOs over the past decade is, at least in part, a result of changes in venture capital. Since 
real estate investment trusts rarely raise funding through venture capital, they offer a 
subset of the IPO market that can be analyzed separate from any possible effects of 
changes in venture capital structure. 
In this paper I test the two primary explanations for the IPO downtrend, by 
examining the relationship between quarterly initial public offering volume for U.S. 
REITs and a number of factors thought to have drastically impacted such volume over the 
past twenty years. Thus far I have presented a numerous summary statistics that support 
the fact that initial public offerings related to real estate investment trusts have declined 
significantly over the past twenty years, particularly with respect to small-firm offerings. 
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To further test the predictions of these two theories, with respect to the initial 
public offerings of real estate investment trusts, I use time-series regression analysis to 
ascertain if there is support for either of the primary theories related to the downtrend in 
small-firm IPOs. At the core of the study, I examine the relationships between the 
primary legislation thought to impact IPOs, as well as economies of scope, and quarterly 
REIT initial public offering volume. To study these relationships I use two different 
dependent variables in separate models: The quarterly number of REIT initial public 
offerings, and the quarterly dollar volume of REIT IPOs. I use the following regression 
specification: 
Quarterly IPO Activityt = α + β1 x Time Trendt    (1) 
+ β2 x Gramm-Leach-Bliley Dummy 
+ β3 x Sarbanes-Oxley Act Dummy 
+ β4 x Global Settlement Dummy 
+ β5 x Regulation NMS Dummy 
+ β6 x Small Firms with Negative Returnst-1 
+ β7 x IPO Initial Returnt-1 + β8 x Real GDP Growtht-1 
+ β9 x NAREIT Indext-1 + β10 x NASDAQ Indext-1 + ε 
 
where, Quarterly IPO Activityt denotes either the quarterly number of initial 
public offerings, or the natural log of the quarterly dollar volume of initial public 
offerings, depending on the model. Quarterly dollar volume of IPOs is scaled by the 
Consumer Price Index, with the base year of 2010. Time Trendt denotes the quarterly 
time trend variable used to measure a gradual change in the volume of IPOs over time, as 
 120 
a proxy for changes in economies of scale/scope during the sample period, following 
Gao, Ritter, and Zhu (2013), and Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001). The time 
trend equals 0.10 for the first quarter of 1991, and increases by 0.10 for each quarter 
thereafter, until the fourth quarter of 2010. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Dummy denotes whether 
the quarter was before or after passing of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, which 
repealed the Glass-Steagall Act. The variable equals zero for all quarters prior to the new 
rules, and one after. Sarbanes-Oxley Dummy represents a dummy explanatory variable 
used to capture the importance of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 on quarterly IPO 
volume. The dummy variable equals zero in quarters prior to July 2002, when the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act was enacted, and is equal to one until after the fourth quarter of 
2007, when the Securities Exchange Commission relaxed the compliance requirements 
on small firms. For all periods after the fourth quarter of 2007, the dummy variable 
equals zero. Global Settlement Dummy, denotes whether the quarter was before or after 
the Global Settlement of 2003, and equals one for all quarters prior to the settlement, and 
one for all quarters after. Regulation NMS Dummy, represents whether the quarter was 
before or after the enactment of Regulation NMS in 2005. The variable equals zero for all 
quarters prior to the legislation, and one after. Percentage of Small Firms with Negative 
Returnst-1 represents the percentage of small firms that had negative returns from the 
prior quarter. Initial Returnst-1 denotes the average initial return in the quarter prior to the 
instant quarter. Real GDP Growtht-1 Is the percentage of Real GDP Growth in the quarter 
prior to the instant quarter. NAREIT Indext-1 denotes the National Association of Real 
Estate Investment Trusts Index for the quarter prior to the instant quarter. NASDAQ 
Indext-1 represents the NASDAQ Composite Index in the quarter prior to the instant 
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quarter. The model specification also includes an AR(1) Coefficient. 
The regression analysis is performed with two different models, each used to 
measure REIT initial public offerings activity. First, following the literature, I use the 
quarterly number of REIT initial public offerings. As a second analysis, I use the 
quarterly dollar volume of REIT IPOs as the dependent variable. In both instances, the 
sample is divided into two categories, one related to small-firm REIT IPOs, and a second 
group of large-firm REIT IPOs. I define small-firm IPOs offerings of less than $150 
million, at the time of the offering. Approximately 50% of IPOs fit into the categories of 
small-firm and large-firm IPOs, based on this cut off. 
Each primary regression model includes two variables of interest. First, following 
Gao, Ritter, and Zhu (2013), I include a time trend to proxy for the gradual change in the 
impact of economies of scale and scope on quarterly IPO volume. The Economies of 
Scope Theory suggests that the decline in small-firm IPOs has been primarily due to a 
gradual change in the economy, which benefits large companies.  Following Gao, Ritter, 
and Zhu (2013) and Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001),29 I use a time trend 
explanatory variable to capture the effect of economies of scope/scale and the importance 
of a gradual change in the overall environment related to small real estate investment 
trusts.30 Consistent with the literature, I begin the time trend in the first quarter of 1991, 
and increase the variable quarterly until the end of our sample in the fourth quarter of 
2010. If economies of scale and scope have played a primary role in the decline in small-
                                                          
29 Gao, Ritter, and Zhu (2013) use a time trend to test the impact of economies of scope on IPO volume in 
the general IPO market. Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001) use a time trend to test for a gradual 
increase in idiosyncratic stock volatility. 
30 The use of the time trend serves the primary purposes often cited as appropriate for use of a time trend in 
regression equations. The time trend captures trajectory of the variable over time, as well as the effect of 
relevant variables in the regression equation that change over time and are not directly measurable. 
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firm REIT IPOs, one would expect to observe this fact through this explanatory variable. 
A statistically significant result related to the coefficient on the time trend in the 
regressions would indicate that there is a gradual, linear relationship between quarterly 
IPO volume and an increase in time through the sample. Further, a positive/negative 
coefficient on the time trend would suggest that there is a continuous increase/decline in 
REIT IPO volume over time. A negative coefficient would support the Economies of 
Scope Theory. 
The second primary variable of interest in each model is used to measure the 
impact of regulation on the number and volume of REIT initial public offerings. 
According to the Regulatory Overreach Theory, overly excessive government regulations 
imposed costs on small firms, and the result has been a significant decline in small-firm 
initial public offerings. If government regulations played a significant role in the decline 
in small-firm REIT IPOs, one would expect to see this fact through a time-series study of 
REIT IPO activity. 
Each model specification includes an explanatory variable corresponding with 
one of the major pieces of legislation that has been cited as a possible cause of the 
significant decline in initial public offerings over the past decade. While the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act is considered the primary legislation that increased the compliance costs of 
public firms, regulations enacted both before and after have also been suggested as 
having imposed burdens that impacted IPOs. If the regulations played a significant role in 
curbing the volume of small-firm IPO activity, one would expect this effect to be 
observable in regressions of IPO volume. The regulatory variables were chosen to reflect 
the possible legislative burdens outlined under the Regulatory Overreach Theory, and 
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include: 
A. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999. 
B. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.  
C. The Global Settlement of 2003. 
D. Regulation NMS of 2005. 
I use dummy variables to indicate whether the specific quarter was during the 
influence of such legislation. For each regulatory variable the dummy flag is zero prior to 
the enactment of the legislation, and one after its passing into law. It is important to note 
that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act became law in 2002. The compliance requirements, 
however, were relaxed for small firms in the fourth quarter of 2007. Therefore, the SOX 
dummy variable is zero prior to the enactment of the law, and one from the time it was 
passed until the fourth quarter of 2007, when it again becomes zero. Each regulation is 
tested individually, together with control variables, as well as with the time trend, and 
control variables, to ascertain the impact of the legislation. A negative coefficient related 
specific legislation would suggest that such laws contributed to the decline in IPO 
volume. 
Table 21 reports the time-series regression results with quarterly number of small-
firm REIT IPOs as the dependent variable, and estimated over the 1991 through 2010 
period. Models 1 through 8 test the number of quarterly small-firm IPOs, each with a 
different regulatory variable alone, as well as with the time trend. At the core of my 
empirical findings is the result that, with respect to the number of small-firm REIT IPOs, 
the coefficients on the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the Global Settlement, and Regulation NMS 
variables are not significant, in the presence of the time trend variable. 
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TABLE 21: Quarterly time-series regressions of number of small-firm REIT IPOs 
This table reports the results from the regressions of quarterly number of small-firm 
initial public offerings on the time trend variable, as well as the regulatory variables, and 
control variables, during the sample period of 1991 through 2010. Small-firm offerings 
are defined as initial public offerings of less than $150 million, while large-firm offerings 
are those $150 million or larger. The data is collected from the National Association of 
Real Estate Investment Trusts. Quarterly IPO Activity denotes the quarterly number of 
initial public offerings. Time Trend denotes the quarterly time trend variable used to 
measure a gradual change in the volume of IPOs over time, as a proxy for changes in 
economies of scale/scope during the sample period, following Gao, Ritter, and Zhu 
(2013), and Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001). The time trend equals 0.10 for the 
first quarter of 1991, and increases by 0.10 for each quarter thereafter, until the fourth 
quarter of 2010. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Dummy denotes whether the quarter was before or 
after passing of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, which repealed the Glass-Steagall 
Act. The variable equals zero for all quarters prior to the new rules, and one after. 
Sarbanes-Oxley Dummy represents a dummy explanatory variable used to capture the 
importance of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 on quarterly IPO volume. The dummy 
variable equals zero in quarters prior to July 2002, when the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was 
enacted, and is equal to one until after the fourth quarter of 2007, when the Securities 
Exchange Commission relaxed the compliance requirements on small firms. For all 
periods after the fourth quarter of 2007, the dummy variable equals zero. Global 
Settlement Dummy denotes whether the quarter was before or after the Global Settlement 
of 2003, and equals one for all quarters prior to the settlement, and one for all quarters 
after. Regulation NMS Dummy represents whether the quarter was before or after the 
enactment of Regulation NMS in 2005. The variable equals zero for all quarters prior to 
the legislation, and one after. Percentage of Small Firms with Negative Returns denotes 
the percentage of small firms that had negative returns from the prior quarter. Initial 
Returns denotes the average initial return in the quarter prior to the instant quarter. Real 
GDP Growth Is the percentage of Real GDP Growth in the quarter prior to the instant 
quarter. NAREIT Index denotes the National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts 
Index for the quarter prior to the instant quarter. NASDAQ Index represents the NASDAQ 
Composite Index in the quarter prior to the instant quarter. The model specification also 
includes an AR(1) Coefficient. Year dummies are included in the specification, but not 
reported. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
   TA
B
LE
 2
1:
 C
on
tin
ue
d 
  
N
um
be
r o
f S
m
al
l-F
irm
 R
EI
T 
IP
O
s 
Sm
al
l I
PO
s/
Al
l 
IP
O
s 
  
M
od
el
 1
 
M
od
el
 2
 
M
od
el
 3
 
M
od
el
 4
 
M
od
el
 5
 
M
od
el
 6
 
M
od
el
 7
 
M
od
el
 8
 
M
od
el
 9
 
M
od
el
 1
0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ti
m
e 
tr
en
d 
 
-.0
94
4 
 
-.3
18
8*
**
 
 
-.3
99
5*
* 
 
-.3
92
4*
**
 
-.3
51
0*
**
 
-.0
49
1*
**
 
 
 
(-0
.5
7)
 
 
(-3
.1
2)
 
 
(-2
.2
8)
 
 
(-2
.8
8)
 
(-3
.9
8)
 
(-2
.8
8)
 
Gr
am
m
-L
ea
ch
-B
lil
ey
 
Du
m
m
y 
-1
.8
11
0*
**
 
-1
.4
31
6*
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(-4
.4
2)
 
(-1
.8
4)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sa
rb
an
es
-O
xl
ey
 D
um
m
y 
 
 
-1
.1
23
7*
* 
-.3
26
6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(-2
.3
8)
 
(-0
.6
4)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gl
ob
al
 S
et
tle
m
en
t D
um
m
y 
 
 
 
 
-1
.3
85
3*
**
 
.2
70
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(-3
.1
6)
 
(0
.3
2)
 
 
 
 
 
Re
gu
la
tio
n 
N
M
S 
Du
m
m
y 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-1
.3
12
2*
**
 
.2
94
5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(-2
.6
1)
 
(0
.4
0)
 
 
 
IP
O
 in
iti
al
 re
tu
rn
 in
 (t
-1
) 
-2
.1
53
1*
* 
-2
.2
60
3*
* 
-3
.2
48
0*
**
 
-2
.8
34
0*
* 
-3
.5
92
1*
**
 
-2
.4
77
0*
* 
-3
.1
76
1*
**
 
-2
.5
42
1*
* 
-2
.6
59
8*
* 
 -.
30
21
 
 
(-1
.9
6)
 
(-2
.0
2)
 
(-2
.6
9)
 
(-2
.4
6)
 
(-3
.0
2)
 
(-1
.9
7)
 
(-2
.6
7)
 
(-2
.2
0)
 
(-2
.3
9)
 
(-1
.4
0)
 
N
AR
EI
T 
In
de
x 
(t
-1
) 
-1
.0
75
8 
-1
.2
49
1 
-2
.1
45
4 
-1
.9
73
7 
-2
.2
78
2 
-1
.9
52
6 
-2
.4
29
7 
-1
.9
25
6 
-1
.9
90
9 
-.4
25
4 
 
(-0
.5
0)
 
(-0
.5
7)
 
(-0
.9
3)
 
(-0
.9
0)
 
(-1
.0
1)
 
(-0
.8
9)
 
(-1
.0
6)
 
(-0
.8
8)
 
(-0
.9
1)
 
(-1
.0
1)
 
Re
al
 G
DP
 G
ro
w
th
 (%
) (
t-
1)
 
60
.6
97
5*
 
60
.2
62
0*
 
 1
14
.9
78
3*
**
 
75
.0
74
3*
* 
86
.1
51
4*
* 
68
.1
31
1*
* 
74
.6
60
9*
* 
72
.0
89
1*
* 
69
.2
82
2*
* 
10
.6
68
1 
 
(1
.7
9)
 
(1
.7
7)
 
(3
.2
8)
 
( 2
.1
2)
 
(2
.4
9)
 
(1
.9
7)
 
(2
.0
3)
 
( 2
.0
6)
 
(2
.0
3)
 
(1
.6
1)
 
N
AS
DA
Q
 In
de
x 
(t
-1
) 
-.1
78
7 
-.0
37
6 
1.
13
24
8 
.6
81
1 
1.
65
26
 
.4
68
2 
1.
50
50
 
.4
96
6 
.6
37
6 
.0
83
3 
 
(-0
.1
0)
 
(-0
.0
2)
 
(0
.6
2)
 
(0
.4
0)
 
(0
.9
3)
 
(0
.2
6)
 
(0
.8
3)
 
( 0
.2
8)
 
(0
.3
7)
 
(0
.2
5)
 
Co
ns
ta
nt
 
2.
28
96
**
* 
2.
48
20
**
* 
1.
42
05
**
* 
2.
68
50
**
* 
1.
88
73
**
* 
2.
80
27
**
* 
1.
71
86
**
* 
2.
78
20
**
* 
2.
73
30
**
* 
.4
64
3*
**
 
  
(5
.5
4)
 
(4
.6
5)
 
(3
.9
0)
 
(5
.0
5)
 
(4
.5
4)
 
(4
.9
1)
 
(4
.1
4)
 
(5
.1
4)
 
(5
.2
1)
 
(4
.5
8)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
 
80
 
80
 
80
 
80
 
80
 
80
 
80
 
80
 
80
 
80
 
Ad
ju
st
ed
 R
-s
qu
ar
ed
 
0.
26
 
0.
26
 
0.
14
 
0.
23
 
0.
18
 
0.
22
 
0.
15
 
0.
22
 
0.
23
 
0.
12
 125 
 126 
The results indicate that there is no relation between this legislation and small-firm REIT 
IPOs, after accounting for the gradual change in the overall economic environment for 
small firms, and is inconsistent with the Regulatory Overreach Theory.  The result is also 
consistent with Gao, Ritter, and Zhu (2013), which tested the Regulatory Overreach 
Theory on a sample of all U.S. IPOs, and found no support for the premise that 
government regulations have caused the decline in initial public offerings. In Models 1 
The Gramm-Leach-Blilly Act variables are negative and significant. Although the 
coefficient is smaller in Model 2, this result holds even in the presence of the time trend 
variable, which indicates that this legislation is inversely related to quarterly small-firm 
REIT IPO volume during the sample period, after accounting for other factors. The 
coefficient of -1.8110 suggests that the legislation is related to approximately 2 fewer 
small-firm REIT IPOs per quarter. 
The results in Table 21 also indicate that the time trend variable is related to the 
decline quarterly in small-firm REIT IPO activity. A primary result of the regression 
analysis is the negative, significant coefficient on the time trend variable in Models 4, 6, 
8, and 9.  In Model 4, for example, the coefficient is -.3188 (significant at the 5% level), 
which implies that by the end of the sample period, the quarterly volume of small-firm 
IPOs declines by 2.8736 (-.3592 x 0.10 trend per quarter x 80 quarters), or 11.4944 
yearly, from the beginning of 1991. Compared to the yearly sample average of 5.15 
small-firm REIT IPOs over the sample period, the time trend is economically significant. 
The results indicate that there is a significant, inverse relationship between quarterly 
small-firm offering volume and the time trend, and support the Economies of Scope 
Theory. The results are also consistent with the results in Gao, Ritter, and Zhu (2013), 
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which also found a statistically significant inverse relation between the time trend used to 
account of economies of scope and the quarterly IPO volume of small firms. 
To further examine the possible impact of government regulation on small-firm 
REIT IPO activity, I also regress quarterly dollar volume of REIT initial public offerings 
on the explanatory variables discussed above. Table 22 reports the regression results 
related to this analysis. The model specification again tests the four primary regulatory 
variables, as well as the time trend and control variables. The results with the dependent 
variable of quarterly dollar volume of IPOs are similar to those found with respect to the 
number of quarterly offerings. In the presence of the time trend, only the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley regulatory variable is statistically significant. In all of the other models testing the 
regulatory variable coefficients are insignificant, in the presence of the time trend 
variable. After accounting for the gradual decline in quarterly IPO volume, as suggested 
by the Economies of Scope Theory, none of the other regulations appear to have a 
relationship with the decline in the volume of small-firm REIT initial public offerings, 
except the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. The results add further support that, other than the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, government regulations are not related to the decline in small-
firm REIT IPOs, and are inconsistent with the Regulatory Overreach Theory. 
Specifically, with respect to the test of the Economies of Scope Theory, the time 
trend in the regressions of quarterly small-firm REIT IPO volume on the explanatory and 
control variables, the results indicate that there is a negative, significant relationship 
between the time trend and the volume of small-firm offerings during the sample period. 
The results with respect to the time trend are significant in all of the models, except the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley model. 
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TABLE 22: Quarterly time-series regressions of volume of small-firm REIT IPOs 
This table reports the results from the regressions of quarterly volume of small-firm 
initial public offerings on the time trend variable, as well as the regulatory variables, and 
control variables, during the sample period of 1991 through 2010. The data is collected 
from the National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts. Quarterly IPO Activity 
denotes the natural log of the quarterly dollar volume of small-firm initial public 
offerings. Small-firm offerings are defined as initial public offerings of less than $150 
million, while large-firm offerings are those $150 million or larger. Quarterly dollar 
volume of IPOs is scaled by the Consumer Price Index, with the base year of 2010. The 
other variables are defined as in Table 5. The model specification also includes an AR(1) 
Coefficient. Year dummies are included in the specification, but not reported. T-statistics 
are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
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Table 23 presents the regression results using the number of quarterly large-firm 
IPOs during the sample period as the dependent variable. As can be seen, none of the 
variables corresponding to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the Global 
Settlement, or Regulation NMS are significant. Table 24 reports similar results with 
respect to quarterly large-firm real estate investment trust IPO volume. Overall, the 
results suggest that this legislation is not significantly related to the decrease in the 
number of large-firm IPOs, and are inconsistent with the Regulatory Overreach Theory, 
as well as Gao, Ritter, and Zhu (2013). 
The finding that there does not appear to be a relationship between the regulations 
tested and the number of large-firm IPOs also holds when including the time trend in the 
specification. Note, however, that the time trend is not statistically significant in any of 
the models when testing REIT large-firm IPOs (Models 14, 16, 18, and 19). The 
coefficient on the time trend is statistically signification when regression the number of 
large-firm IPOs, scaled by the total number of IPOs (Model 20). 
Interestingly, the results related to REIT large-firm IPO volume are somewhat 
different. As can be seen in Table 24, the variables with respect to the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act and the Global Settlement are both statistically significant, even after controlling for 
the gradual change in the economic climate. Only under Model 16, however, is the time 
trend significant itself. The results related to the impact of regulations and the changes in 
the economic environment on the number and volume of large-firm REIT initial public 
offerings are not consistent, and indicate that the decline in these types of offerings is 
possibly related to other factors. 
 
 131 
TABLE 23: Quarterly time-series regressions of number of large-firm REIT IPOs 
This table reports the results from the regressions of quarterly number of large-firm initial 
public offerings on the time trend variable, as well as the regulatory variables, and control 
variables, during the sample period of 1991 through 2010. Small-firm offerings are 
defined as initial public offerings of less than $150 million, while large-firm offerings are 
those $150 million or larger. The data is collected from the National Association of Real 
Estate Investment Trusts. Quarterly IPO Activity denotes the quarterly number of initial 
public offerings. The other variables are defined as in Table 5. The model specification 
also includes an AR(1) Coefficient. Year dummies are included in the specification, but 
not reported. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 24: Quarterly time-series regressions of volume of large-firm REIT IPOs 
This table reports the results from the regressions of quarterly volume of large-firm initial 
public offerings on the time trend variable, as well as the regulatory variables, and control 
variables, during the sample period of 1991 through 2010. The data is collected from the 
National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts. Quarterly IPO Activity denotes 
the natural log of the quarterly dollar volume of large-firm initial public offerings. Small-
firm offerings are defined as initial public offerings of less than $150 million, while 
large-firm offerings are those $150 million or larger. Quarterly dollar volume of IPOs is 
scaled by the Consumer Price Index, with the base year of 2010. The other variables are 
defined as in Table 5. The model specification also includes an AR(1) Coefficient. Year 
dummies are included in the specification, but not reported. T-statistics are reported in 
parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively.
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3.5 Conclusion 
 It is well-documented in the financial literature that there has been a precipitous 
decline in the number of initial public offerings since 2000. This decline in the primary 
capital raising and exit strategy for companies has been particularly significant for small 
companies. With respect to real estate investment companies, the trend has been so 
significant that small-firm REIT IPOs have virtually disappeared from the financial 
landscape. 
A number of theories have been suggested in the literature to explain this 
phenomenon. This paper examines the two explanations cited most frequently, the 
Regulatory Overreach Theory and Economies of Scope Theory, from the unique 
perspective of Real Estate Investment Trusts. I present findings that are inconsistent with 
the Regulatory Overreach Theory, and provide support for the Economies of Scope 
Theory with respect to small-firm initial public offerings. Specifically, I find that there is 
no relation between the number of quarterly small-firm REIT IPOs, as well as the dollar 
volume of such IPOs, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the Global Settlement, and Regulation 
NMS, after controlling for changes in the economic climate for small firms. In addition, 
my results support the Economies of Scope Theory, and suggest that the decline in the 
number of small-firm REIT IPOs has been a gradual trend rather than one punctuated by 
discrete shocks. 
With respect to large-firm REIT IPOs I find that there does not appear to be a 
relationship between the number of large-firm REIT offerings, and major legislation 
thought to have impacted initial public offerings. The results provide limited support for 
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the theory that government regulations have had an impact large-firm REIT initial public 
offering volume over the past decade. 
This paper offers a unique perspective on the declining initial public offering 
phenomenon. To our knowledge, no other literature has examined the recent changes in 
the initial offering of equities, from the perspective of real estate-related firms. I provide 
an examination of the current theories found in the general finance literature, to ascertain 
their applicability to REIT IPOs. 
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APPENDIX: TABLES 
 
 
TABLE A: Venture capital commitments index. 
This table presents the dollar amount committed to venture capital firms by investors per 
quarter during the sample period. The table also presents the Venture Capital 
Commitments Index, calculated using 2005 as the base year. Data is collected from the 
National Venture Capital Association. 
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TABLE A: Continued 
Year Quarter Commitments ($) Index 
    2005 Q1 $5,489,500,000 1.00 
 
Q2 $6,491,200,000 1.18 
 
Q3 $5,389,500,000 0.83 
 
Q4 $9,276,200,000 1.72 
2006 Q1 $6,544,500,000 0.71 
 
Q2 $14,185,500,000 2.17 
 
Q3 $5,375,300,000 0.38 
 
Q4 $5,592,800,000 1.04 
2007 Q1 $5,754,200,000 1.03 
 
Q2 $9,141,800,000 1.59 
 
Q3 $8,763,700,000 0.96 
 
Q4 $11,016,200,000 1.26 
2008 Q1 $6,959,200,000 0.63 
 
Q2 $9,247,700,000 1.33 
 
Q3 $8,449,900,000 0.91 
 
Q4 $3,620,400,000 0.43 
2009 Q1 $5,373,900,000 1.48 
 
Q2 $4,718,000,000 0.88 
 
Q3 $2,310,300,000 0.49 
 
Q4 $4,053,100,000 1.75 
2010 Q1 $3,968,800,000 0.98 
 
Q2 $2,142,800,000 0.54 
 
Q3 $2,991,600,000 1.40 
 
Q4 $2,989,900,000 1.00 
2011 Q1 $7,604,200,000 2.54 
 
Q2 $2,650,400,000 0.35 
 
Q3 $2,116,000,000 0.80 
 
Q4 $6,105,000,000 2.89 
2012 Q1 $4,801,300,000 0.79 
 
Q2 $6,319,300,000 1.32 
 
Q3 $5,223,900,000 0.83 
 
Q4 $3,354,600,000 0.64 
2013 Q1 $4,386,200,000 1.31 
 
Q2 $3,260,100,000 0.74 
 
Q3 $4,357,500,000 1.34 
  Q4 $4,913,000,000 1.13 
 
Total $204,937,500,000 
  
 
  
 144 
TABLE B: Venture capital investments index. 
 
This table presents the dollar amount invested by venture capital organizations in firms, 
per quarter during the sample period. The table also presents the Venture Capital 
Investments Index, calculated using 2005 as the base year. Data is collected from the 
National Venture Capital Association. 
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TABLE B: Continued 
Year Quarter Investments ($) Index # of Deals Index 
      2005 Q1 $5,222,131,500 1.00 761 1.00 
 
Q2 $6,437,135,600 1.23 860 1.13 
 
Q3 $6,063,227,100 1.16 809 1.06 
 
Q4 $5,801,971,800 1.11 863 1.13 
2006 Q1 $6,606,487,600 1.27 904 1.19 
 
Q2 $7,386,288,200 1.41 1007 1.32 
 
Q3 $6,852,042,400 1.31 955 1.25 
 
Q4 $6,669,683,200 1.28 1016 1.34 
2007 Q1 $7,450,067,000 1.43 907 1.19 
 
Q2 $7,839,808,500 1.50 1115 1.47 
 
Q3 $8,211,663,500 1.57 1049 1.38 
 
Q4 $8,450,874,600 1.62 1156 1.52 
2008 Q1 $8,109,060,700 1.55 1060 1.39 
 
Q2 $8,032,363,000 1.54 1107 1.45 
 
Q3 $7,616,451,300 1.46 1047 1.38 
 
Q4 $6,190,988,900 1.19 964 1.27 
2009 Q1 $3,847,950,100 0.74 680 0.89 
 
Q2 $5,094,191,200 0.98 761 1.00 
 
Q3 $5,425,461,800 1.04 766 1.01 
 
Q4 $5,897,606,000 1.13 939 1.23 
2010 Q1 $5,088,759,400 0.97 823 1.08 
 
Q2 $7,125,033,700 1.36 1025 1.35 
 
Q3 $5,451,651,900 1.04 888 1.17 
 
Q4 $5,694,433,200 1.09 910 1.20 
2011 Q1 $6,509,901,100 1.25 905 1.19 
 
Q2 $8,196,010,900 1.57 1084 1.42 
 
Q3 $7,557,191,500 1.45 1018 1.34 
 
Q4 $7,446,918,300 1.43 994 1.31 
2012 Q1 $6,304,123,300 1.21 880 1.16 
 
Q2 $7,396,341,300 1.42 982 1.29 
 
Q3 $6,677,519,500 1.28 946 1.24 
 
Q4 $6,945,409,200 1.33 1050 1.38 
2013 Q1 $6,000,373,700 1.15 909 1.19 
 
Q2 $7,073,786,900 1.35 977 1.28 
 
Q3 $7,921,604,700 1.52 1032 1.36 
  Q4 $8,369,192,800 1.60 1077 1.42 
 
Total $242,963,705,400 
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